The People\u27s Republic of China and the World Trade Organization: Anticipating a United States Congressional Dilemma by Bacon, Brad L.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2000
The People's Republic of China and the World
Trade Organization: Anticipating a United States
Congressional Dilemma
Brad L. Bacon
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bacon, Brad L., "The People's Republic of China and the World Trade Organization: Anticipating a United States Congressional
Dilemma" (2000). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 95.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/95
Articles
The People's Republic of China and the
World Trade Organization: Anticipating a
United States Congressional Dilemma
Brad L. Bacon*
I. Introduction
"China is not yet our enemy, but neither is it our friend."'
On November 15, 1999, representatives of the United States
and the People's Republic of China ("China") executed a
landmark trade deal that will almost inevitably pave the way for
China's entry into the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 2 Af-
ter more than 13 years of bilateral negotiations, a handshake
between United States Trade Representative ("USTR")
Charlene Barshefsky and China's Foreign Trade Minister Shi
Guangsheng sealed the terms of a bilateral deal that has been
* Brad L. Bacon is an attorney with Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin
LLP in Kansas City, Missouri. The author wishes to thank Professor John
Head of the University of Kansas School of Law for his patience and intellectual
generosity in reviewing early drafts of this article. The author would also like
to thank Mr. Jeffrey Gertler of the WTO, ChinaOnline, and Inside US Trade for
their invaluable research assistance.
1. Senator Tim Hutchinson, An Open-Eye China Policy (visited Jan. 8,
1999) -.--http://www.congressvote.com/senatevote/issues/issue235/item5393.
asp>. While participating in an online forum sponsored by SenateVote.com,
Senator Hutchinson (R-Ark) opined:
"China is not yet our enemy, but neither is it our friend. Our China-cen-
tered foreign policy and our obsession with trying to appease Beijing's demands
and accede to its wishes will only serve to strengthen a regime that may in turn
seek to extinguish the flames of democracy abroad as they have done so effec-
tively at home. We must recognize a menace before it becomes a threat and act
to protect our interests and promote our values in Asia." Id.
2. See, e.g., Dexter Roberts et al., Welcome to the Club, BusNESS WEEK,
Nov. 29, 1999, at 34; Brendan Pearson, China comes in from the cold, THE Aus-
TRAI.IN FNANcu L REV., Nov. 16, 1999, at 1.
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praised as "the Rubicon in China's opening to the outside
world"3 and a "watershed in US-China relations."4
Until November, however, there had been no indications
that the most populous country 5 and tenth largest trading na-
tion worldwide 6 was willing and able to obtain membership in
the WTO, the sole global trading institution today. Member-
ship 7 in the Geneva-based body that sets global trade rules has
escaped China since 1994.8 The announcement of a significant
trade deal prior to the Millennial Round negotiations of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAT7") was hardly ex-
pected9 in light of the trade frictions that marred the Sino-US
trade relationship in 1999. Indeed, the last year of the 1900s
could hardly be called a banner year in the history of Sino-US
trade relations.
Consider the smorgasbord of events that reeked havoc on
Sino-US trade relations during 1999. The nations relentlessly
sputtered over trade "speedbumps" ranging from the United
States's seemingly unmanageable trade deficit' ° to free-floating
3. Joseph Fewsmith, China and the WTO: The Politics Behind the Agree-
ment, NAT'L BUREAu OF AsIAuN RESEARCH REPORT, Nov. 1999 (visited Dec. 5,
1999) <http://www.nbr.org/publications/report.html>.
4. Id.
5. See BuREAu OF EAST AsiAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS, US DEP'T OF STATE,
BACKGROUND NOTES: CHINA , Oct. 1998 (visited Jan. 30, 1999) <httpJ/www.
state.gov/www/background-notes/China_1098-bgn.html> [hereinafter BACK-
GROUND NOTES].
6. See China Was World's 9th Largest Exporter, 11th Largest Importer in
1998, WTO Says, CHINAONLU-E, Feb. 17, 1999, available in CHINAONLINE, Legal
Library <http'J/www.chinaonline.com>. Because CHNAONLiNE articles are typ-
ically unavailable to non-subscribers, CHINAONLn-E articles will hereafter be
cited "on file with author."
7. As of November 13, 1999, membership in the WTO consists of 135 gov-
ernments and includes most global superpowers. See Press Pack: 3' Ministe-
rial Conference, WTO, Nov. 28, 1999, at 58.
8. Correspondence with Jeffrey Gertler, Secretary of China's Working
Party, WTO (Mar. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Gertler Correspondence].
9. Cf Bruce Stokes, Almost Now-or-Never Time, NAT'L J., Dec. 12, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 21794652 (speculating that "the next opportunity for
China's WTO membership is 2003" if the United States and China could not
have reached terms of accession before year-end 1999); Gertler Correspondence,
supra note 8 (noting that there "is a renewed sense of optimism about reaching
agreement by the end of 1999 (in advance of the Seattle kick-off of the next
round of multilateral trade negotiations)").
10. See e.g., Paul Magnusson et al., A Backlash Against Beijing is Building,
Bus. WK., Jan. 18, 1999, at 55; Trade Deficit Swells to Record High, NY TIMES
ON THE WEB, July 20, 1999 (visited July 20, 1999) <http://www.nytimes.com/
aponline/f/AP-Economy.html> (noting that through June 1999, "the U.S. trade
deficit is running at an annual rate of $225 billion, more than one-third higher
than last year's $164.3 billion, which had been a record high").
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fears about Chinese nuclear proliferation11 to renewed skepti-
cism over human rights in China. 12 Allegations of military espi-
onage emanated from the infamous Cox Report' 3 and the two
nations disagreed over the United States's support of Taiwan,
which is considered a renegade province by China. 14 Premiere
Zhu Rongji's springtime visit failed to strengthen accession rela-
tions in lieu of what might be deemed by some as a White House
mockery (i.e., turning down a Chinese accession package in
which China made major concessions toward WTO entry).15 But
the crem de la crem of this year's Sino-US strife was undoubt-
edly the bombing of the Chinese embassy by American-led
NATO forces during the Kosovo conflict. 16
Of course, the awe and optimism displayed by trade enthu-
siasts and Sinologists tend to overshadow the fact that the
United States Congress may pose a significant hurdle to Ameri-
11. See e.g., Douglas Paal, Political, Economic and Strategic Trends in East
Asia, Harvard University Asia Center's Modern Asia Series, Spring 1999 (vis-
ited Aug. 5, 1999) <httpJ/www.fas.harvard.edu/-asiactr/MAS_030599.htm>;
Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, China's Hollow Military, 56 THE NAT'L INTER-
EST (Summer 1999) (on file with author); Susan V. Lawrence and Shawn W.
Crispin, Behind the Lines, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 8, 1999 (visited July 17,
1999) <httpJ/www.feer.com/Restricted/99apr-08/foreign.html>.
12. See, e.g., 1999 Outlook: China, 16 INT'L TRADE REP., No. 3, at 120 (Jan.
20, 1999); Helene Cooper, Clinton Criticizes Chinese Record On Human Rights,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2000, at A4. Cooper quotes State Department spokesman
Rubin as remarking:
"Over the past year, the government of China intensified its crackdown on
political dissent, initiated a campaign to suppress the Falun Gong, and intensi-
fied controls on unregistered churches and on the political and religious expres-
sion of ethnic minority groups, especially Tibetians." Id.
13. See, e.g., House Committee Says US Security Harmed by Export of Sen-
sitive Technology to China, 16 INT'L TRADE REP., No. 1, at 6 (Jan. 6, 1999) (rec-
ognizing that the Cox Report ultimately concluded that "national security was
harmed" by technology exports to China). See also Senate Rejects Amendment
Requiring OK By Congress of US-China WTO Entry Deal, 16 INT'L TRADE REP.,
No. 12, at 489 (Mar. 24, 1999).
14. See e.g., William Roberts & Heidi Przybyla, Some US-China issues are
resolved, J. COM., Apr. 12, 1999 at 4A; Erik Eckholm, Violative Issues Await
China's Premier in US, NY TmiEs, Apr. 4, 1999 (on file with author).
15. See generally Bruce Gilley and Shawn W. Crispin, Limited Engage-
ment, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 22, 1999 (visited July 17, 1999) <http://ww.feer.
com/Restricted/99apr 22foreign.html>; Daniel H. Rosen, China in the WTO: A
Great Leap Forward for US Businesses?, CHINA ONLuI, May 1999 (on file with
author) thereinafter Rosen: A Great Leap Forward].
16. See Richard Fisher, Director of Asian Studies at the Heritage Founda-
tion in Washington, described general frustrations with China (after witnessing
Beijing's response to the errant NATO bombing) when he stated, "The ice is
beginning to congeal. How many fund-raising scandals, cases of espionage and
now embassy trashings do we need to endure to be convinced that China is not
really our friend?" Lawrence and Crispin, supra note 11.
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can business realizing the oft-discussed financial benefits which
the November agreement connotes. Commentators 17 are now
beginning to recognize that the Hill may compose a very real
obstacle to what has been called "one of President Bill Clinton's
biggest foreign policy prizes."' 8 The debate, which will hit the
floor of Congress in the spring of 2000,19 is destined to be "the
most important economic debate in years."20
One of the most looming questions is whether Congress will
grant China permanent "normal trade relations"21 status with
the United States, which is a fundamental benefit that the other
WTO members currently enjoy under domestic law. Though
Congressional approval is not a prerequisite to China's accession
to the WTO, Congress determines how much the United States
will reap the financial benefits of this toughly negotiated agree-
17. See, e.g., Joanne Gray, Clinton trade deal not home yet, THE AusTRA-
LLAN FiNANcLiL REv., Nov. 17, 1999, at 12; James H. Nolt, China in the WTO:
The Debate, FOREIGN PoLicY IN Focus, Dec. 1999 (visited Jan. 5, 2000) <httpJ/
www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol4/v4n38china.html>; US Administra-
tion Prepares Congressional Move On China WTO Deal, INSIDE CHINA TODAY,
Nov. 20, 1999 (on file with author); David S. Broder, The Inescapable Issue,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 19, 1999, at B7; Joseph Kahn, Clinton Will Press Con-
gress to Back Trade Deal With China, NY TiEs, Jan. 10, 2000 (visited Jan. 10,
2000) <httpJ/nytimes.comlyr/mo/day/late/lltrade.html>.
18. Gray, supra note 17, at 12.
19. Nicholas Lardy has stated that, in his opinion, there is a very practical
deadline for the normal trade relations vote and, accordingly, Congress will
make its decision in February or March, 2000. However, Gary Horlick has ex-
pressed doubt with that time frame. In his opinion, Mr. Horlick thinks that the
nature of the issue (i.e., an issue which can hurt Congressional Representatives
in the eyes of their constitutents) will result in the debate dragging out longer
than expected. See The WTO in Seattle: Controversy Over New Rules of Global
Commerce, TRANSCRIPr OF A BROOKINGS INsTITUTE PRESS BRIEFING, Nov. 23,
1999 (visited Dec. 5, 1999) <http//www.brook.edu/comm/transcripts/19991123.
htm>; Kahn, supra note 17 (reporting that the Clinton administration fears
that Republicans will delay a vote on the agreement until after the national
political conventions in June).
20. Broder, supra note 17 (quoting White House aides).
21. Normal trade relations status was previously known under United
States trade law as "most favored nation" status, not to be confused with MFN
as used in the GATT/WTO regime. The change in domestic terminology oc-
curred when President Bill Clinton signed into law Pub. L. 105-206 on July 22,
1998. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685. For an excellent explanation of the mechanism
formerly known as most favored nation status and the Jackson-Vanik Amend-
ment, see Annita Lysikatou, Engagement with China: A Smithian Perspective,
Nov. 28, 1999 (visited Dec. 5, 1999) <http://www.american.edu/projects/man-
dala/TED/Smith/lysikatou.htm>.
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ment.22 China's accession to the WTO would not technically be
impeded by a Congressional denial of normal trade relations sta-
tus, but the United States would be denied the Chinese market
access concessions solidified in the November bilateral agree-
ment if a Congressional vote in the negative were to occur.23
While it is difficult to predict the decisions of Congress,
early indications are that rallying enough Congressional sup-
port for the deal will be extremely difficult. 24 Political partisan-
ship will obviously underscore Congressional votes,25 as will
lobbying pressures from industry groups with deep pockets and
heavy influence. 26 But what are the facts, factors and exper-
iences associated with today's Sino-US trade relations?
22. See Stephen J. Yates, US to China: Join the WTO, but Real Work Lies
Ahead, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION EXEcUTIVE MEMORANDUM NO. 638, Dec. 9,
1999 <http'//www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/em638.html>.
23. See id. If Congress refuses to grant permanent, unconditional normal
trade relations status to China as it accedes to the WTO, China would likely
invoke the so-called "non-application" exemption of Article XIII of the WTO
Agreement. Invocation of Article XIII would allow China to join the WTO and
extend W TO rights and benefits to all of its trading partners except the United
States. In such a situation, none of the WTO rules would apply to trade be-
tween the United States and China. The main trade competitors of the United
States (i.e., the European Union and Japan) would principally benefit from such
circumstances. See Stephen H. Dunphy, Yearly fight on China trade is now
one-time, winner-take-all battle, SEATTLE TiMEs, Dec. 26, 1999, at 1.
24. See Broder, supra note 17. Broder notes:
"Rep. Bob Matsui of California, the point main for the White House on
this issue, told me that if most Republicans back the business-sup-
ported effort to open the Chinese market to American goods and serv-
ices, it will be tough to produce enough Democratic votes to pass the
measure."
Id. See also US Administration Prepares Congressional Move on China
WTO Deal, supra note 17(noting that at this time, "the Republican-controlled
Congress, much of which is not particularly China-friendly, votes on such sta-
tus each year"); Tom Squitieri, Buchanan: Trade fight is a winner, USA TODAY,
Dec. 27, 1999, at 13A (noting that Buchanan has promised to oppose the Presi-
dent in Congress if President Clinton seeks to grant China permanent normal
trade relations status); Dunphy, supra note 23 (predicting that that the Con-
gressional battle over granting permanent normal trade relations status to
China "will be fierce"); Kahn, supra note 17 (speculating that the vote will be "a
close contest"). But cf. The WTO in Seattle: Controversy Over New Rules of
Global Commerce, supra note 19 (quoting Nicholas Lardy as remarking, "I
think that permanent NTR status for China is going to pass the Congress. I
think there will be a spirited debate, but I, quite frankly, don't think the out-
come is in doubt . . . There's very strong support for it across a very broad
spectrum.").
25. See, e.g., US Administration Prepares Congressional Move on China
WTO Deal, supra note 17; Welcome to the Club, supra note 2, at 34-36; Gray,
supra note 17; Kahn, supra note 17.
26. In 1997, AFL-CIO President John Sweeney turned the North America
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") "fast track" issue into a litmus test issue by
374 M~iNN. J GLoBAL TRADE[Vl9:6
The purpose of this article is to examine facts, experiences,
etc. that the United States Congress will mull over when debat-
ing the bilateral accord with China and which might ultimately
persuade Congress not to support the November agreement.
Part II of this article provides background information funda-
mental to any Chino-WTO discussion from a Western perspec-
tive, including: the WTO accession process; China's history with
the GATT/WTO regime; an abbreviated history of modern Sino-
US trade relations; and benefits to-be-gained from China's ac-
cession to the WTO.
Next, this article explores China's accession accomplish-
ments and shortcomings. Part III begins by narrating China's
tremendous accession progress, culminating with a cursory re-
view of the terms of the November trade deal. Part III then de-
tails eight non-tariff accession issues in an attempt to portray
historical facts which Congress might give credence to in decid-
ing whether to support the much-hyped bilateral agreement.
These eight accession issues are: transparency; inspection stan-
dards, certification and testing; protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights ("IPR"); foreign investment and service industries;
local-content requirements; trading rights (i.e., import/export
quotas and licensing); foreign currency exchange restrictions;
and export subsidies and performance requirements.
Part IV scrutinizes a particularly sensitive area of China's
still-developing relationship with WTO norms: Chinese subsidi-
zation of State-owned enterprises ("SOEs").27 By way of back-
ground, the roles of SOEs in China are described prior to
analyzing three relevant WTO instruments: the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the "SCM Agree-
threatening to deny financial aid (via campaign contributions) to Democrats
who supported President Bill Clinton on the fast track proposal. At least one
commentator has noted that such tactics have "made a critical difference" from
Congressional votes in which no such tactics were used, such as the initial Con-
gressional vote on NAFTA in 1993. See Broder, supra note 17. See, e.g., Wel-
come to the Club, supra note 2; Dunphy, supra note 23; Kahn, supra note 17.
27. For purposes of this article, SOEs are defined as government entities
that are owned, controlled or supported by the government and which purchase
goods or services in international trade for purposes other than government
use. In theory, China's SOEs are owned by the masses; in practice, these collec-
tively-owned enterprises are controlled by, and affiliated with, governments at
the county level and higher. Control by the governmental bodies involves allo-
cations of credits, goods and personnel. See Shuhe Li, The Road from Socialism
to Capitalism: Determinants of the Private Sector Development in Chinese In-
dustry, July 9, 1999 (visited July 18, 1999) <http://faculty.washington.edu/
karyiu/confer/HK99/papers/index.htm>.
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ment"),28 the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Meas-
ures (the "TRIMs Agreement"),29 and the Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XVII of the GATT 1994 (the "Article
XVII Understanding").30 Part IV then engages a particularly
well documented subsidization practice associated with China's
SOEs - the absorption of SOEs' debt and losses - under the fore-
going WTO instruments to demonstrate why Congress might
find this practice offensive under the WTO regime and, accord-
ingly, economically adverse to the United States.
Part V of this article looks at various Chinese laws, regula-
tions and guidelines that govern operations of SOEs in China
which must be amended (if not repealed) in light of the Novem-
ber bilateral agreement. This section takes a textualist ap-
proach, much like Congress might do, in evaluating these
Chinese instruments as they relate to SOE subsidization.
Finally, Part VI concludes that notwithstanding China's re-
cent lunge toward market liberalization, the United States Con-
gress will be skeptical to support measures relating to the
historic bilateral agreement, including the obtainment of perma-
nent normal trade relations status, based on the history of ac-
tions and snafus associated with trading with China over the
last 25 years.
II. Background
A. AN ACCESSION ROAD MAP
Unlike many multilateral agreements, the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO
Agreement")31 does not establish detailed membership require-
ments for its government members. Instead, the WTO Agree-
ment merely provides that any nation "possessing full autonomy
in the conduct of its external commercial relations" may accede
28. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, infra note 31, at Annex 1A [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
29. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, infra note 31, at Annex 1A [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement].
30. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII [hereinafter Arti-
cle XVII Understanding] of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 1994
[hereinafter GATT 1994], WTO Agreement, infra note 31, at Annex 1A. The
Article XVII Understanding is but one legal instrument incorporated into the
GATT 1994 that was not a part of the GATT 1947. Reference to this incorpora-
tion can be found in the GATT 1994, id. at par. 1(c)(ii).
31. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in LAW & PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZA-
TION vol. 1 (Oceana Publications, Inc., 1995) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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to the WTO,3 2 assuming the government is willing to accept the
obligations imposed by the Multilateral Trade Agreements. 33
The accession process commences with the submission of a
formal written request for accession under Article XII of the
WTO Agreement. 34 Accession decisions are rendered exclu-
sively by the WTO members at Ministerial Conferences and re-
quire approval by a two-thirds majority vote of the members. 35
A non-GATT party attempting to accede must have concluded
negotiations for its accession to the GATT prior to accepting the
WTO Agreement.3 6 If an accession request is received from a
country that is in the process of joining the GATT, then "the Pre-
paratory Committee shall, to the extent practicable, examine
the request jointly with the Working Party established by the
Contracting Parties to GATT 1947 to examine the accession of
that State."37
The accession process is complicated by two factors. First,
the WTO Agreement provides that the WTO "shall continue the
practice of decision-making by consensus followed under the
GATT 1947."38 Matters are deemed to have been decided by
32. See Id. at art. XII(1). For a detailed and exhaustive explanation of the
accession process, see generally TRADING INrO THE FUTURE: THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, WTO (2d ed., Apr. 1999) at 14.
33. See WTO Agreement, supra note 31, at art. II(2). The Multilateral
Trade Agreements, or "framework agreements," are the legal instruments in-
cluded in Annexes 1-3 of the WTO Agreement that bind all WTO members.
Alternatively, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements included in Annex 4 of the
WTO Agreement bind only those Members who have voluntarily accepted them.
Id. at arts. H(2) and (3).
34. See About the WTO: The Organization, WTO (visited Apr. 14, 1999)
<http'//www.wto.orgabout/organsn6.htm>.
35. See WTO Agreement, supra note 31, at art. XII(2).
36. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, par. 5, LAW & PRACTICE OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 31 [hereinafter Final Act].
37. Decision on the Acceptance of and Accession to the Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, dec. 2(a), LAW & PRACTICE OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 31, at booklet 5. This Ministerial Decision
also provides that the prepared accession report "shall be taken into account by
the Ministerial Conference in its consideration of any application by the State
or separate customs territory concerned to accede to the WTO Agreement." Id.
at 2(b). The Final Act, or WTO "charter," states that by signing the Act, the
Members "agree ... to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions." See
Final Act, supra note 36, at par. 2(b).
38. WTO Agreement, supra note 31, at art. IX(1). Despite the fact that
consensus voting is technically an exercised preference, the preference has be-
come, as a practical matter, a required function in WTO decision-making in
light of the few GATT/WTO decisions that have been rendered by vote. See
infra text accompanying note 40.
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consensus if no member present at the Ministerial Conference
formally objects to a proposed decision.39 All relevant issues, in-
cluding accession decisions, will be decided by vote only if a deci-
sion cannot otherwise be made by consensus.40 The predilection
for decision making by consensus is extremely strong, with less
than a dozen matters being decided by vote since the GATT's
inception.41
Second, once a country applies for WTO membership and
tenders a memorandum detailing its laws, regulations, and poli-
cies affecting investment and trade, the prospective member be-
gins to negotiate bilateral market access agreements with
individual WTO members. 42 As explained by the WTO Secreta-
riat, "each accession is principally a negotiation between the
WTO Members and the applicant [, the pace of which] depends
in large measure on the capacity of the acceding government to
negotiate actively at the bilateral and multilateral level."43 All
bilateral negotiations must be concluded before the Working
Party may submit a Protocol of Accession at the Ministerial Con-
ference for approval. Each WTO member, therefore, effectively
wields a veto power over prospective members should the WTO
member refuse (expressly or through indirect action) to conclude
bilateral market access negotiations, which in turn prevents an
accession protocol from being submitted to the General Council
for an accession decision. 4"
B. CHINA AND THE GATT/WTO REGIME
The turbulent love affair between China and the GATT/
WTO regime dates back to the establishment of the GATT 1947.
China was a founding member in the GATT 1947,45 the legal
39. See WTO Agreement, supra note 31, at fn. 1.
40. See id. at art. IX(1).
41. See Robert P. O'Quinn, How to Bring China and Taiwan into the
World Trade Organization, HERITAGE FOUND. ASIAN STm. CTR. BACKGROUNDER
No. 140, Mar. 22, 1996 (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <httpJ/www.heritage.org/library/
categories/trade/ascbgl40.html>.
42. See Decision on Accession to the Agreement on Government Procure-
ment, para. 1(c), LAw & PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra
note 31, at booklet 5. This Ministerial Decision notes that prospective members
"interested in accession would hold consultations with the Parties on the terms
for its accession." Id. See also Accession to the WTO - State of Play, WTO Doc.
WTIGC/W/100 (Sept. 30, 1998) (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http:www.wto.org/wto/
about/GCW100.html.
43. Accession to the WTO, supra note 42.
44. See O'Quinn, supra note 41.
45. See, e.g., 1 FRANK W. SWACKER ET AL., WORLD TRADE WITHoUT BARRI-
ERS 2 (Frank W. Swacker et al. eds., 1995); Status of Working Party Accessions:
20001
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predecessor of the WTO, but China's tenancy in the GATT was
short-lived as Chang Kiashek and the Taiwanese government
severed ties with the trade vehicle in 1950.46 The Chinese Com-
munist Party abandoned the free market system shortly there-
after in favor of a closed-market economy with absolute
ownership and operation by the State.47
More than thirty years passed before China demonstrated
an interest in renewing ties with the multilateral trade regime.
China's first efforts to resume its GATT seat resulted in China
receiving "observer" status in November 1982.48 On July 16,
1986, Beijing formally notified the GATT's contracting parties of
China's desire to again participate in the trade agreement,49
tendering the requisite memorandum describing China's trade
system soon thereafter. 50 While a GATT Working Party was es-
tablished in March 1987 to negotiate China's accession, China
failed to renegotiate its GATT membership prior to the Uruguay
Round and was, therefore, limited to participating in the monu-
mental negotiations as an observer. 51 As an observer, China
neither participated in the formal decision-making process (ob-
servers have no vote) nor submitted schedules of commitments
in goods or services. 52
In 1994, China commenced a massive campaign to join the
GATT upon the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, an effort that
culminated in China submitting a formal bid for accession to the
China, WTO, May 1999 (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <httpJ/www.wto.org/wto/about/
china.htm>.
46. See, e.g., Gertler Correspondence, supra note 8; Rui Mu & WANo
GUIGUO, CHINESE FOREIGN ECONOMIC LAw: ANALYsis AND COMMENTARY, Pt. 13,
p. 18 (Rui Mu & Wang Guiguo eds., 1994). China was unable to participate in
the GATT after Chang Kiashek severed mainland China's ties because the
GATT officially recognized the Chinese seat as belonging to the Taiwanese gov-
ernment. When the GATT followed a 1971 decision by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly to recognize mainland China as the only legitimate government
of China, China's observer status was terminated and it immediately became
legally competent to participate in the GATT once more.
47. See SWACKER ET AL., supra note 45, at 2-3. See generally KENNETH A.
CUTSHAW & JILNvI ZHANG, DOING BusINEss IN CHINA 1174-81 (Kenneth A. Cut-
shaw & Jianyi Zhang eds., 1997).
48. See O'Quinn, supra note 41.
49. See Request By the People's Republic of China to Participate in the
GATT, 27 I.L.M. 1419 (1988).
50. See O'Quinn, supra note 41 (reporting that China tendered the neces-
sary memorandum on Feb. 13, 1987).
51. See id. (citation omitted) with fn. 57, infra.
52. See Gertler Correspondence, supra note 8.
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WTO on December 7, 1995. 5 3 Beijing relished the thought of be-
ing a founding member of the WTO, envisioning the move as a
"political recognition of China's status as a world economic
power."54 In contrast, however, numerous economic superpow-
ers drove home the non-political nature of the WTO solely as a
commercial contract, insisting that China's accession would only
be acceptable on commercially viable terms. 55 To date, China
professes a desire to join the global trade institution but has
failed to produce an agreement on accession that is acceptable
all members of China's Working Party in the twenty-plus formal
Working Party sessions convened since 1987.56
What does this mean for China? China is attempting to join
the WTO as a newly acceding government rather than as a
GATT contracting party.57 Consensus voting means that China
must gain the support of the most powerful and influential
GATT contracting parties to avoid accession objections at the
Ministerial Conferences or, alternatively, take the more rigorous
accession path and secure the votes of at least two-thirds of the
WTO members. The bilateral negotiations requirement also
means that China must avoid reaching "choke points" in market
access negotiations to avoid any effects that would, practically
speaking, veto a Chinese accession. As of July 1998, China's
Working Party opined that while negotiations on goods and
53. See Communication from China, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/1 (Dec. 5,
1995) (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <httpJ/www.wto.org> (available in the documents
database with the search term "WT/ACC/CHN").
54. O'Quinn, supra note 41.
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., US Makes Progress in China WTO Talks But No Deal Before
Zhu's Visit, Daley Says, 16 INT'L TRADE REP., No. 11, at 442 (Mar. 17, 1999)
(reporting that China's Foreign Trade Minister told reporters on March 12,
1999 that "China's position on the WTO has never changed... China wishes to
enjoy the rights and undertake the obligations under the WTO").
57. When China sought to participate in GATT negotiations during the
1980s, China challenged the legality of Chang Kiashek's severance of mainland
China's GATT membership, contending that the Chinese Communist Party
never resigned from the GATT. After China expressed an interest in renewing
its ties with the GAT, a Working Party on China's Status as a Contracting
Party was formed to renegotiate the terms of China's contracting party status.
In 1995, after the completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, this Working
Party was transformed into a WTO Working Party on the Accession of China.
While the legality of China's 'Kiashek challenge" was never resolved, China has
committed to apply for WTO membership as a newly acceding government.
See, e.g., Gertler Correspondence, supra note 8; Thomas Yunlong Man, Na-
tional Legal Restructuring in Accordance with International Norms: GATTI
WTO and China's Foreign Trade Reform, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STuD. 471, 473-
75 (1997).
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services are advanced (in addition to the United States, China
has now substantially or successfully negotiated bilateral acces-
sion terms the European Union, Australia, Canada, and Ja-
pan),5" numerous issues remain open and subject to further
consultation.59
The nature of the accession process also brings to light the
importance of the November trade deal with the United States.
On a multilateral level, the United States is a member of the
Working Party on the Accession of China 60 and thus, influences
the direction of the multilateral accession demands imposed on
China. On a bilateral level, China was able to prevent the
United States from invoking its "bilateral veto" power. In doing
so, China operated predominantly within the legal confines of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 199461 and the accompa-
nying Executive Statement of Administrative Action.62 These
58. See, e.g., 1999 Outlook: China, supra note 12, at 120; Australia Backs
China WTO Bid, CHINAONLINE, July 14, 1999 (on file with author); Japan,
China Reach Basic WTO Agreement, INSIDE CHINA TODAY, July 8, 1999 (on file
with author); Yates, supra note 22 (noting that China is expected to sign bilat-
eral deals with Canada and the European Union in the near future on substan-
tially similar terms as the deal recently negotiated with the United States).
59. See Accession to the WTO, supra note 42.
60. See Gertler Correspondence, supra note 8 (noting that the Working
Party, which is chaired by Mr. Pierre-Louis Girard of Switzerland, is comprised
of 54 Members).
61. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3531-32)
(1994), as amended by Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). The GATT
1994 entered into force in the United States on January 1, 1995.
62. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1133 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2905). This law requires the Presi-
dent to make certain determinations about China's SOEs, including: whether
China's SOEs account for a significant share either of China's exports, or
China's goods that are subject to competition from goods imported into China;
and whether these enterprises adversely effect United States's foreign trade or
the its economy in general. If both determinations are made in the affirmative,
the WTO Agreement cannot apply between China and the United States until
either China enters into agreement regarding its SOE operations, or federal
legislation is enacted that supports application of the WTO Agreement to
China. For a discussion regarding what would happen if China becomes a WTO
member and Congress has not passed the necessary legislation, see generally
China Trade: Hearings on China's WTO Membership and Most-Favored-Nation
Status Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
105' Cong (1998) (statement for the record by JayEtta Z. Hecker, Assoc. Dir.,
Int'l Relations and Trade Issues, Nat'l Security and Int'l Affairs Div.), reprinted
in GAO/T-NsLD-98-209, June 17, 1999. China also faces a large statutory obsta-
cle in the Jackson-Vanik amendment of the Trade Act of 1974, which limits the
trading privileges the United States may grant to countries that Congress de-
termines to be suppressing their national citizens. For further discussion of
this statutory constraint in the context of China's accession to the WTO, see,
e.g., Alan S. Alexandroff, Concluding China's Accession to the WTO: The US
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federal measures require the USTR to "consult with Congress
before voting in favor of a Protocol of Accession."63 As previously
noted, however, persuading Congress (an especially difficult
task so far)64 that China's accession is paramount and appropri-
ate may prove daunting.65
C. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN SINO-US RELATIONS
i. Paving the Way: The Pre-WTO Framework
The Reagan Administration laid the foundation for modern
day trade relations with China. The United States-China Trade
Agreement of 1980 ("Trade Agreement")66 bestowed Most Fa-
vored Nation ("MFN")67 status on China,68 which not only
Congress and Permanent Most Favored Nation Status For China, 3 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 23 (1998); Richard W. Stevenson, Capital Hill Is a Barrier
to China Goal, NY TIMES, Apr. 9, 1999 (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http'J/www.ny-
times.com/yr/mo/day/news/world/china-congress.html>; Lysikatou, supra note
21.
63. Alexandroff, supra note 62, at 31.
64. See id. at 34-39 (discussing proposed bills regarding United States sup-
port for China's accession, most of which are unfavorable towards China and
would require Congressional approval before supporting China's accession).
See also Chad Bowman, Gephardt Bill Would Require Hill OK Before US Sup-
port for China Accession, 16 INTL TRADE REP., No. 11, at 357 (Mar. 3, 1999);
Rossilla Brevetti, Helms, Hollings to Introduce Bill Requiring Congress to Vote
on China WTO Accession, 16 INTL TRADE REP., No. 9, at 443 (Mar. 17, 1999);
Robert G. Kaiser, House Democrats Facing A Dilemma on China Deal, WASH-
INGTON POST, Nov. 21, 1999, at A10; David R. Francis, Partisan Ping-Pong may
delay China deal, CHRISIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 22, 1999 (visited Dec. 28,
1999) <http:www.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/11/22/pl7sl.html>; Patrick J.
Buchanan, A Time for Truth About China, THE AMERICAN CAUSE, Apr. 5, 1999
(visited Dec. 5, 1999) <http'J/www.theamericancause.org/pjb-speech-china.
html>.
65. For an excellent discussion of the fashioning of America's China policy,
see Alexandroff, supra note 62. In his introduction, Alexandroffnotes that "[als
with trade policy generally, American support for China's accession to the WTO
will require not only executive backing but the approval of Congress as well."
Id. at 24.
66. Agreement on Trade Relations Between The United States of America
and the People's Republic of China, July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651; T.I.A.S. No.
9630 <httpJ/www.ustr.gov/reports/tpa/1998/contents.html>(entered into force
on February 1, 1980). See also 1998 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 1997 ANNuAL
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM 188 (noting that "[tihe framework for US trade relations with China"
is based on the Trade Agreement) [hereinafter 1997 ANNuAL REPORT]. Cf.
Lysikatou, supra note 21, at 3 (explaining that the Jackson-Vanik extension
was awarded by Congress with respect to China on January 24, 1980).
67. See supra note 21.
68. See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 188 (noting that "(tihe
framework for US trade relations with China is based on" the Trade Agree-
ment). While this treaty was negotiated and signed into law by President
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helped cement favorable Sino-US trade relations but also
prompted trade between the two nations to double over the next
year.69 The United States and China were also able to with-
stand and survive disputes in textile trade in the early 1980s
which "proved to be the first dueling grounds for the two
countries."70
The birth of the multilateral trade negotiations known as
the Uruguay Round 71 also impacted our Chinese relations dur-
ing the 1980s. When China indicated an interest in re-acquiring
Contracting Party status in the GATT in 1986, the United
States devised a multifaceted plan for China's membership into
the GATT. 72 Not unlike the November bilateral agreement, the
plan called for greater transparency, the establishment of a na-
tional trade regime, deconstruction of non-tariff barriers incon-
sistent with GATT principles, a demonstrated commitment to
trade and price reforms, and (assuming membership was se-
cured) provisions safeguarding against possible market disrup-
tions caused by China's non-market practices. 73
The United States became further committed to interna-
tional trade when the Bush Administration took over the Presi-
dency in 1989. Most significantly, Sino-US relations weathered
the notorious Tiananmen Square incident7 4 to conclude several
important trade agreements in the Administration's first year
alone, including a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") to
improve IPR protection in China and three agreements relating
Carter, the Reagan administration was the most immediate recipient of the
benefits it conferred. As such, it is discussed under the Reagan Administration
rather than the Carter Administration.
69. See BUILDING AMERICAN PROSPERITY IN THE 2 1 ' CENTRrY, REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON US- PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY 97 (Apr. 1997),
available at <http://www.ustr.gov> [hereinafter BUILDING AMERICAN
PROSPECTS].
70. Id. at 97.
71. See id. at 98.
72. See id. at 99.
73. See id. 99-100.
74. See CUTSHAW & ZHANG, supra note 47, at 1184-86. The United States
enacted several measures in condemnation of China's brutal suppression of the
1989 Tiananmen Square "political rebellion." Some of these measures included:
suspending high-level exchanges with China; suspending weapons exports to
China; and imposing a series of economic sanctions on China, many of which
directly affected foreign investment and trade. Id. at 1185-86. Among the for-
eign investment and trade-related sanctions were measures that opposed new
loans to China by international financial institutions; suspended all new activi-
ties relating to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") and
Trade and Development Program ("TDP"); and, halted further liberalization of
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. Id. at 1186.
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to launch services, technology safeguards, and liability of com-
mercial spacecrafts.7 5 Although two Section 301 actions 76 were
brought against China for IPR infractions and other market ac-
cess barriers during this time, the ultimate outcome - a 1992
Market Access MOU with China - was a positive step towards
accomplishing many current WTO requirements. 77
ii. The Clinton Years: Concluding the Uruguay Round and
Beyond
The Clinton Administration ushered in a renewed commit-
ment to international trade, placing even greater emphasis on
generating trade with Pacific Rim countries than the preceding
administrations. 78 The United States led efforts to solidify
China's membership in the GATT primarily to encourage the na-
tion to adopt attitudes, laws, and procedures consistent with in-
ternational trading.79 The immediate results were nothing but
promising, with China reducing its average tariff rate by 50% on
December 31, 1993.80
The Clinton Administration brought with it a vigor to en-
force agreements signed with China since 1992.81 Special 301
thvestigations into China's IPR protections were initiated in
June 1994, with the USTR determining some twenty months
later that China's IPR policies burdened American trade and
commerce.8 2 The USTR pledged that if China could not satisfac-
torily resolve its outstanding IPR-related problems, the United
States would impose 100% tariff rates on $1.08 billion of China's
imports. The Section 301 investigation and sanctions were ter-
75. See BunDING AMERICAN PROSPERITY, supra note 69, at 103-104.
76. As noted by the Office of the USTR:
"Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (the Trade Act), is the
principal US statute for addressing foreign unfair trade practices affecting US
exports of goods or services. Section 301 may be used to enforce US rights
under bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and may also be used to re-
spond to unreasonable, unjustifiable, or discriminatory foreign government
practices that burden or restrict US commerce."
1997 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 238.
77. See BumDiNG AMERICAN PROSPERrY, supra note 69, at 104. The 1992
Market Access MOU resulted in China's commitment to remove numerous non-
tariff barriers, reduce certain tariff rates, increase transparency of Chinese
trade law, curb import substitution policies, and eliminate import testing and
standards requirements as trade barriers. Id.
78. See id. at 106-08.
79. See id. at 112.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
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minated, however, when China promised to take aggressive ac-
tion in cracking down on piracy and to provide foreign IPR
holders greater market access.8 3
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations also ex-
panded the parameters of Sino-US accession negotiations to en-
compass the Uruguay Round results.8 4  An unfortunate
consequence of these amplified accession negotiations was the
rise of disagreements over China's protocol commitments, dis-
agreements which stalled Sino-US accession negotiations in late
1994 and throughout 1995.85 This breakdown in accession nego-
tiations arguably prompted increased accession demands from
the United States, demonstrated by the contents of a confiden-
tial trade report outlining issues China would have to resolve
prior to gaining American accession support.8 6 A barrage of
trade difficulties came on the heels of this report, with the next
few years marred with several disparaging trade allegations
against China.8 7
Accession negotiations were rejuvenated in 1997 after
China put forth serious proposals toward liberalizing its mar-
kets for goods and services.88 Chinese President Jiang Zemin
and Trade Minister Wu Ti presented phase out offers that would
reduce tariff rates to an average of 10% and eliminate all non-
tariff barriers by 2005, contingent on China's accession to the
WTO.8 9 Many of the 114,000 patents and 121,000 trademarks
issued by China went to American businesses;90 China agreed to
comply with the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
83. See BUILDING AMERICAN PROSPERITY, supra note 69, at 112.
84. See id. at 113.
85. See id. (noting that negotiations "reached an impasse in 1994 over ne-
gotiations on China's protocol commitments, the portion of accession dealing
with adherence to WTO principles").
86. See Alexandroff, supra note 62, at 24 n. 2.
87. See BUILDING AMERICAN PROSPERITY, supra note 69, at 127 tbl. 4 (China
was listed as a Priority Foreign Country on the 1996 Special 301 Report for
Asia Pacific Countries).
88. See United States-China Business Council, China and the WTO: Criti-
cal Issues and Objectives - June 1998 (visited Jan. 30, 1999) <http'J/www.us-
china.org/press/WTO.html> (explaining that "negotiations intensified when
China put serious offers on the table to liberalize its trade in goods and serv-
ices"). But cf Charles Owen Verrill, Jr. et al., International Trade, 32 INTL
LAW. 319, 320 (1998) (reporting that Sino-US accession negotiations "produced
little progress" in 1997).
89. See Verrill, supra note 88.
90. See Hearings on the Renewal of Normal Trade Relations with China
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance (July 9, 1998) (testimony of US Trade Rep-
resentative Charlene Barshefsky) (on file with author) [hereinafter Barshefsky
Testimony].
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("TRIPs") Agreement upon accession; 9 1 and China removed most
formal quotas and import licensing requirements applicable to
products covered by the 1992 Market Access MOU. 9
2
Intensified accession discussions carried over into 1998 and
1999 without significant progress, largely because bilateral ne-
gotiations were complicated by two factors independent of the
WTO. First, the United States's growing trade deficit with
China was a huge source of trade friction. 93 All told, the deficit
was exceeding $1 billion per week in China's favor while Ameri-
can exports to China have totaled a mere $9 billion since it re-
ceived MFN status in 1980.9 4 The deficit factor might not have
played (and continue to play) such a prominent role except that
one-third of the United States's overall trade deficit -again, the
largest in Western history- is with China.9 5 Speculation
loomed that China was dragging its feet in the accession process
because China already received the most favorable trading sta-
tus conferred under the WTO from the United States without
having to comply with all WTO requirements. 9 6 In other words,
and ignoring WTO benefits that China may have been losing out
on, China was having its MFN cake and eating it, too, by not
having to comply with WTO standards that otherwise bind WTO
members.
Second, the downturn of Asian financial markets triggered
the question of whether China has the ability to weather diffi-
cult economic times without unduly hindering China's accession
efforts financially. Washington found China's responses to the
economic turmoil unsatisfactory and claimed that China's in-
creased protectionist measures (taken in direct response to the
91. See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 189.
92. See id. at 190.
93. See, e.g., USTR Charlene Barshefsky: Toward the Pacific Community:
American Trade Policy in Asia, Remarks Before the Asia Society (Jan. 21, 1999)
[hereinafter Barshefsky: Toward the Pacific Community]; US Makes Progress,
supra note 56.
94. See Barshefsky: Toward the Pacific Community, supra note 93.
95. See Stokes, supra note 9. China's trade surplus is expected to reach
US$60 billion in 1999. See William J. McMahon, House Backs Clinton, Affirms
China's Trade Status, CHINAONLINE, July 27, 1999 (on file with author).
96. See Stokes, supra note 9 (noting that "a key reason Beijing is dragging
its feet on WTO membership is that its exports already receive MFN treatment
from its major trading partners," and "(w]ith China already enjoying the single-
most-important benefit of WTO membership, it is little wonder that Beijing
thinks the status quo is just fine"); Rethinking China, Bus. WK., Mar. 4, 1996,
57-65.
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economic downward spiral) harmed American exports.97 Refer-
ring to export subsidies and other newly-erected trade barriers,
Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade David
Aaron noted that China's attempt to bolster its economic recov-
ery came via "hidden devaluation."9 Moreover, the economic
slowdown appeared to have curtail the appeal of the WTO to
China, which may have caused China to further delay accession
negotiations. 99
97. See Frank James, US Bristles Over China Trade Limits, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 17, 1998, available at 1998 WL 23516071 (referring to the economic down
slide and China's new trade barriers, Commerce Secretary William Daley re-
portedly stated that if China continued to do "what they've done ... over the
last six months" [taking "pure protectionist actions"], then China would force
the US to respond adversely); Christopher Lingle, China doesn't belong in the
WTO, J. COM., Mar. 5, 1999, available at <http://www.joc.com/>, Archives Li-
brary (noting that "[girowing Chinese subsidies to exporters are a form of pro-
tectionism that amount to a stealth devaluation").
98. David Ibison, US Official Blasts Beijing Export Subsidies, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22051278 (quoting Under-
secretary Aaron as saying that China's recently-erected trade barriers, export
subsidies in particular, "amount to hidden devaluation"). Nicholas Lardy noted
in April 1999 that newly-adopted economic policies included: price floors on a
broad range of goods subject to competition from imports; import licensing re-
strictions and import-inhibitive quotas; and access restrictions to foreign ex-
change for importers and foreign-funded firms. See Nicholas Lardy, China's
WTO Membership, BROOKIENGS INST. POL'Y BRIEF No. 47, Apr. 1999 (visited July
17, 1999) <http'//www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb047/pb47.htm>.
As of August 1999, China's retail prices had spiraled downward for 22
months, and the trend applied to more than 80% of all major Chinese commodi-
ties. China Sees Continued Falling Prices, NEwSEDGE CORP., Aug. 6, 1999 (on
file with author). Unemployment in China is at a 30-year high, and its
problems with deflation are "quite substantial because of excess capacity across
such a broad range of industries, declining consumer demand, and declining
price levels both at the retail level and at the consumer price index level." Dan
Griswold et al., Trade and Transformation of China: The Case for Normal
Trade Relations, THE CATO INST. TRADE BRIEFING PAPER No. 5 at 11, July 19,
1999 (visited July 17, 1999) <httpi/www.freetrade.org/pubs/briefs/tpb-005es.
html> (statement of Nicholas Lardy). Lardy believes that devaluation is immi-
nent - that is, the question is not whether devaluation will occur, but when.
China's WTO Entry Debated at Brookings Institute Conference, CHINAONLINE,
July 23, 1999 (on file with author). See, e.g., Gloomy China growth fuels calls
for fresh stimulus, HONG KONG STANDARD, July 17, 1999 (visited July 18, 1999)
<http'/online.hkstandard.com/fulstory/19990717/bfr0417g.htm>; Manu Bhas-
karan, Rethinking Asia: Will China Derail Recovery?, FAR EASTERN ECON. REv.,
Aug. 5, 1999 (visited Aug. 1, 1999) <http'J/www.feer.com/Restricted/99aug_05/
rethinking.html>.
99. See Ibison, supra note 98. At an internal meeting, Chinese President
Jiang Zemin told State officials that, in essence, China has waited 13 years to
join the GATT/WTO regime and it can wait another 13 years. See Joseph Few-
smith, The Impact of the Kosovo Conflict on China's Political Leaders and the
Prospects for WTO Accession, NAT'L BuREAu OF AsIAN RESEARCH BRIEFING (July
386 [Vol. 9:369
REVIEWING THE FACTS
D. BENEFITS OF CHINA'S ACCESSION
Notwithstanding China's overall state of noncompliance
with the GATT/WTO regime today, China's accession to the
WTO clearly serves important economic and political purposes
for the United States, purposes that have both domestic and in-
ternational overtones. At the international level, the potential
benefits of a successful Chinese accession are best described by a
WTO-drafted "advertisement" summarizing the benefits of
membership in the global trade organization. 100 Among others,
these reasons include: the GATT/WTO regime promotes world
peace through fair trade; international disputes are handled
more "constructively" through the WTO rather than the current
piece-meal processes; rules-based trade "makes life easier for
all;" freer trade provides numerous tangible, economic benefits
(such as reducing costs of living, raising income levels, stimulat-
ing economic growth, and providing more choice of goods); na-
tional governments are "shielded from lobbying;" and the WTO,
whose principles "make life more efficient," encourages good
government. 101
In the case of China, accession promotes at least three fur-
ther international interests. First, WTO membership will cause
China's market to become more interdependent with other econ-
omies worldwide, in turning making it more difficult (i.e., costly)
for China to break off economic ties by violating international
trade agreements and norms. 10 2 This is especially important to
the United States given China's history of "shady" compliance
with past bilateral agreements. 10 3 Second, admitting China into
1999) (visited Aug. 1, 1999) <http://www.nbr.org/publicationis/briefing/few-
smith99/index.html>.
100. See 10 benefits of the WTO trading system, WTO 1999 (visited Apr. 14,
1999) <http'//www.wto.org/wto/lOben/lObenOO.htm> (on file with the author).
101. See id. For a more complete discussion of the "positives" offered by the
WTO, see TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 32, at ch. 1.
102. See generally Jeremy Brooks Rosen, China, Emerging Economies, and
the World Trade Organization, 46 DuIK L.J. 1519, 1549-50 (1997) (citations
omitted). At one point, Rosen quotes Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore as
suggesting that China will become more interconnected with the other major
trading nations of the world, which will ultimately make it "costly for China to
risk rupture of economic ties by violating accepted rules and conventions ...
[and] [tihis can be a powerful factor to keep [China] engaged in the interna-
tional community." Id. at 1549 (citation omitted).
103. Cf. Rosen, An Economic Balance Sheet, infra note 112. In citing a
study conducted by scholars from the University of Georgetown Law Centre
compiling a record of China's compliance with its international obligations, Ro-
sen reports that the results "suggest that China's record, though mixed, is bet-
ter than the detractors think. . . . According to this scorecard, China's
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the WTO is important from a historical perspective - never in
the post World War II era has a top ten trading nation (which
China now is) been excluded from the GATT 1947 regime or its
successor, the WTO.10 4 As one academic notes, the idea of a
WTO "that pretends to truly global status without China in it is
almost comical." 10 5 And finally, China's accession to the WTO
serves international "equality" purposes: as previously noted,
China relishes the notion of being considered an equal of the
global economic superpowers. Welcoming China into "the family
of nations" should relieve international tensions that may sim-
ply result from hard feelings, i.e., problems involving China that
otherwise arise for no apparent reason. 106
On the domestic front, opening China's market means an
opportunity to promote national growth and prosperity. China's
market and its productive capabilities are unprecedented; the
fourth largest trading partner of the United States, 10 7 China is
one of few remaining, virtually untapped major economies of
scale.' 0 8 Opening the market, which supports more than
400,000 American jobs,10 9 will provide an opportunity to reduce
the extraordinarily large trade deficit of the United States.
China's annual growth rate in trade, which at 16% is more than
double the worldwide growth rate, 1 0 offers the fastest growing
export market for American companies in goods and services."'
compliance record is a mixed bag - like that of many emerging countries.
China does not have an exemplary record, but it is wrong to say that China is a
consistent cheater on international sovereign commitments." Id. (citing contri-
butions from James Feinerman and Daniel Chang of the Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center).
104. See Hearings on Changing Congressional Views of the US-China Rela-
tionship Before the Subcomm. on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm. (June 19, 1998) (statement of Nicholas Lardy, Senior
Fellow, The Brookings Institute (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <httpJ/www.brook.edu/
views/testsimony/lardy/19980618.htm> [hereinafter Lardy Testimony].
105. Negotiators Say China's WTO Talks Stall Over Distribution, Insurance,
Telecom, 16 1NT'L TRADE REP. 148, Jan. 27, 1999 (quoting James Feinerman of
the Georgetown University Law Center).
106. See Rosen, supra note 102, at 1548-50.
107. See 1998 ECONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 233.
108. See BUILD1NG AMERICAN PROSPERITY, supra note 69, at 107 (noting that
"Asia Pacific . . . [is] virtually the only region of the world where economic
growth is thriving").
109. See Barshefsky Testimony, supra note 90.
110. See China's Accession to the WTO, US-CmNA EDUC. FouND., 1998 (vis-
ited Jan. 30, 1999) <http://www.uschinatrade.org/news/wto.html> (on file with
author).
111. According to United States International Trade Commission, China's
accession to the WTO would increase United States exports to China by at least
seven percent and Chinese sales to the United States by some ten percent. See
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The federal government estimates that a liberated Chinese mar-
ket could garner an additional $500 million in annual exports to
China.112 American businesses would receive increased foreign
direct investment ("FDI') possibilities, whereas China presently
accounts for only a paltry share of United States investment
abroad while constituting the second largest recipient of global
FDI.113 In addition, China's equity market, which is predicted
to increase more than $200 billion by the year 2000 from the
market's present $300 billion trading level, will provide further
investment opportunities.1 4
Political incentives, possibly overshadowed by financial mo-
tives, are also important notwithstanding the non-political na-
ture of the WTO. China's accession to the world trade regime,
the economic equivalent of the peace-keeping United Nations, 1 5
may alleviate political 'headaches' holding over from past Com-
munist regimes, if not ultimately the downfall of Communism in
China."1 6 Supporting China's accession may mean developing
Peter Hartcher, Small step a giant stride for world trade, THE AUSTRALIAN Fi-
NANCIAL REV., Nov. 16, 1999, at 12.
112. See DFL International, US Commercial Technology Transfers To The
People's Republic of China, REPORT FOR THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES
AND ECONOMIC SECURrrY, BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE pt. 2, 45-46 (Jan. 1999) (citation omitted) [hereinafter BXA REPORT]. Cf.
Daniel H. Rosen, China and the World Trade Organization: An Economic Bal-
ance Sheet, CHINAONLE1-E, May 1999 (on file with author) (reporting that "the
immediate increase in US exports of goods and services to China can be esti-
mated at $3.1 billion"). But cf Robert E. Scott, China Can Wait: WTO accession
deal must include enforceable labor rights, real commercial benefits, ECON.
POL'Y INST.: ISSUE BRIEFING PAPER, May 1999 (visited July 17, 1999) <httpJ/
epinet.org/briefmgpapers/china.html> ("[Tihe U.S. trade deficit with China is
likely to increase by almost $50 billion in the next four years if China is allowed
into the WTO... this would translate into a net loss of 607,000 jobs in the U.S.,
mostly in the manufacturing sector").
113. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 107, at 253. See
also China heads for the WTO, THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Nov. 18,
1999 (visited Dec. 6, 1999) <http://www.eiu.com/vw-lite/
ChinaheadsfortheWTO.asp> (according to the United States government,
actual FDI in China during 1998 amounted only to $3.2 billion).
114. See Benjamin M. Vandegrift, Making Deals in China, Bus. L. TODAY,
NovJDec. 1998, at 40.
115. See SWACKER ET AL., supra note 45 at 1 (noting that the WTO is "in a
position comparable, in the world economy, to that of the United Nations in the
peace process").
116. On a trade level, for example, China's highly subsidized SOEs will
probably be privatized. On a political level, open market economies lend sup-
port to democratic regimes. Sino-US ideological differences may (arguably) be
smoothed over, perhaps not entirely but perhaps in areas of major interest.
Steps have been taken that move "away from the [Chinese] constitutional ideal
of 'socialist public ownership' which has difficulties in surviving the transition
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stronger Sino-US relations overall, ties that can be used to pur-
sue goals in other areas of international concern, such as envi-
ronmental protection. In addition, better Sino-US relations may
help safeguard national security and international tranquility,
which is presently jeopardized by China's exportation of technol-
ogy of mass destruction to non-peaceful nations. 117 Moreover,
there is even speculation that having a closer political ally in
China may lead to improved human rights in China, which has
been notorious for human rights violations long before the 1989
Tiananmen Square massacre." 8
And although perhaps less grandiose than China's full-fledged acces-
sion to the WTO, the November Sino-US trade agreement provides sev-
eral global trade benefits in and of itself. For example, the other WTO
members are now liberated to negotiate and implement their own re-
spective trade deals with China. Countries such as Australia have
been waiting patiently on the United States to conclude its bilateral
negotiations with China before moving forward with the process. 119
In addition, the WTO members should also now feel free to strike trade
deals with Taiwan. Apparently, the WTO governments were unwilling
to risk concluding a trade deal with Taiwan prior to settling up with
mainland China. 120
III. China's Accession Process: A Report Card from the West
A. CHINA'S ACCESSION AccoMPLISHMENTS
China has taken great strides, both multilaterally and bilat-
erally, toward acceding to the WTO in a "commercially meaning-
ful" way. China's published tariffs, which averaged 43% in 1994,
from planned to market economy in a socialist setting." Conita SC Leung, Re-
forming State-owned enterprises: pragmatism before ideology, 4 CHINA L. NEWS
(CCH) 1, Oct. 1997 (noting that "[the Communist Party's endorsement of [SOE
reform] is another bold step away from the constitutional ideal of 'socialistic
public ownership' which has difficulties in surviving the transition from
planned to market economy in a socialist setting"). See also James A. Dorn, The
death of communism in China, J. COM., Mar. 5, 1999, at El.
117. See Richard N. Haass and Nicholas Lardy, The United States and
China: A New Framework, BROOKINGS INST. POL'Y BRIEF No. 25, Oct. 1997 (vis-
ited Feb. 6, 1999) <http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb025/pb25.htm>.
118. See BACKGROUND NoTEs, supra note 5; CUTSHAW & ZHANG, supra note
47 at 1174-78.
119. See Hartcher, supra note 111, at 12 (noting that Australia has been
waiting for a Sino-US trade deal to "enable the entire process to move ahead").
120. See id. According to the US-China Business Council, certain WTO
members have (since Taiwan's WTO Working Party was formed in 1992) been
of the view that the Chinese and Taiwanese WTO applications should be con-
sidered a package deal. Thus, there is "an informal understanding" among
WTO members that China and Taiwan should be admitted together. Questions
and Answers: US-China WTO Agreement, US-China Business Council, Dec. 1,
1999 (visited Jan. 14, 2000) <http'//www.uschina.orgpublic/wto/qanda.html>.
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are reportedly around 17% today.121 The 1992 Market Access
MOU took steps to "confirm" that China has eliminated numer-
ous import substitution regulations and policies. 122 In fact, the
USTR has reported that China has "generally met the require-
ments of the 1992 Market Access MOU." 123
China now has "a functioning system to protect intellectual
property rights."124 China is a member of the Berne Conven-
tion, the Universal Copyright Convention, the Madrid Protocol
on the Protection of Marks, the Paris Convention for the Protec-
tion of Industrial Property, the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization, and the Geneva Phonogram Convention. 125 China
has amended most of its domestic copyright, patent, trademark,
and trade secret laws to account for today's IPR challenges. 126
As a result of China's "comprehensive enforcement system," the
West has seen a considerable increase of IPR protection in
China.' 27 Since 1995, China has shut down more than 60 CD
and CD- ROM production lines and seized more than 15 million
pirated CDs and CD-ROMs. 128 In the Guangdong Providence,
where pirated products have historically been smuggled into
China with ease, enforcement officials confiscated and destroyed
more than 2.8 million pirated products in June 1998 alone.' 29
Plus, more than 3000 Chinese judges have also received legal
training in the field of intellectual property. 130
Sweeping changes have also led to progress with regard to
the elimination of non-tariff market barriers, with more than
185 non-tariff measures having been abolished since 1995
121. See Lardy Testimony, supra note 104. Note, however, that this figure
may not include unreported Chinese tariffs. Moreover, the cited figure un-
doubtedly does not include effective tariff rates. For example, China utilizes a
17% VAT tax on tariff-applicable goods. As such, goods that are subject to a
listed 20% tariff rate would, practically speaking, face an effective tariff rate of
37%. For further discussions of this 'effective' tariff issue, see 1998 NATIONAL
TRADE EsTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN BARRIERS 46-7, OFFICE OF THE USTR (re-
leased Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 NTE REPORT].
122. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 49.
123. Id. at 45.
124. Id. at 53.
125. See TRADE COMPLIANCE CENTER: 1999 INVESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT,
MARKET AccEss UNIT OF THE INT'L TRADE ADMIN., DEP'T OF COM. (visited Jan.
30, 1999) <http://www.mac.doc.gov/tcc> (located in the Market Access Informa-
tion Database) [hereinafter INVEsTMENT CLIMATE REPORT].
126. See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 189.
127. See id.
128. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 53.
129. See Barshefsky Testimony, supra note 90.
130. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 53.
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(predominantly pursuant to the 1992 Market Access MOU). 1 3 1
China slashed the number of commodities subject to export li-
censing by 50% in January 1999, reducing the number from 115
commodities in 1998 to 58 this year.132 China has also started
to provide more liberal trading rights by granting full importing
and exporting rights to 27 private Chinese manufacturers in
early 1999, marking the first time in history that non-State en-
terprises have been permitted to conduct foreign trade on their
own.
13 3
China has taken significant steps towards legal trans-
parency by creating the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation ("MOFTEC") Gazette, which is designed to publish
all trade and investment-related laws and regulations. 3 4
MOFTEC is also taking advantage of modem technology by
maintaining several Internet websites that post various trade
and investment-related laws and regulations. 135 In addition,
China enacted its first unfair competition law in 1993, which for-
bids the use of materials, money, and other means for bribery.136
Moreover, China has consented to the resolution of the right to
judicial review of administrative decisions relating to interna-
tional trade. 137
Notwithstanding the foregoing accomplishments, China's
greatest accession achievement is, without qualification, the
conclusion of the November bilateral trade agreement with the
United States. The favorable terms of the trade pact run deep
131. See id. at 47.
132. See China Reduces Number of Licensed Commodity Exports, CHINAON-
LINE, Feb. 2, 1999 (on file with author) (citing an January 26, 1999 article re-
ported in the Zhonggou Huagong Bao, or China Chemical News). According to
the news report, this information was made public when MOFTEC released the
latest catalog of commodities subject to export licensing requirements. See id.
133. See Private Firms Given Go-Ahead To Engage in Foreign Trade in
China, 16 INTL TRADE REP. 9, Jan. 6, 1999.
134. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 48; INVESTMENT CLIMATE RE-
PORT, supra note 125. Beijing also recently announced that it will revamp sev-
eral Chinese trade laws. Accordingly, the revised laws "should make China's
rules more transparent." Ian Johnson, China Weighs Lifting Curbs on Foreign
Firms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2000, at A17 (citing an article in the China Daily
Business Weekly).
135. For example, MOFTEC is maintaining websites at <http://www.
cei.gov.cn> and <http://www.moftec.com.cn>.
136. See TRADE COMPLIANCE CENTER: 1999 TRADE REGULATIONS AND STAN-
DARDS REPORT, MARKET ACCESS UNIT OF THE INT'L TRADE ADMIN., DEP'T OF COM.
(visited Jan. 30, 1999) <http://www.mac.doc.gov/tcc/> (located in the Market Ac-
cess Information Database) [hereinafter TRADE REGULATIONS & STANDARDS
REPORT].
137. See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 191.
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into the Chinese commercial and political environment,
including:
i. Telecom. China will allow foreign companies to own up to 49% of
China's telecommunication outfits after accession, and that per-
centage will increase to 50% after two subsequent years.
138
ii. Internet. China will allow foreigners to invest in minority shares
of Chinese Internet content providers.
139
iii. Agriculture. China will reduce tariffs on priority agriculture
products to an average of 14.5% (from an average of 31.5% today)
and will wholly eliminate agriculture export subsidiaries. China
also agreed to phase out State trading of soy oil.1
40
iv. Distribution. China will allow foreigners distribution rights,
which will be phased in over three years after accession. 14 1 Re-
strictions on services auxiliary to distribution will also be phased
out within four years, at which time foreign services providers
can establish wholly-owned subsidiaries in China.
142
v. Banking. China will allow 100% foreign ownership of banking
entities after the year 2005, and all present geographic restric-
tions on bank ownership will be phased out immediately.
143
China will also permit foreign banks to conduct local currency
business with Chinese operations two years after accession and
retail business five years after accession. 14 4 In addition, foreign
banks will be permitted to provide auto financing 14 5 and own up
to 50% of local life insurance entities.
14 6
vi. Entertainment. China has agreed to all foreign firms to partici-
pate in 50% of the distribution profits for 20 films annually.
147
138. E.g., Welcome to the Club, supra note 2; Highlights of China-US WTO
accord, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 1999 (visited Jan. 9, 1999) <http'J/cnn.com/ASIA-
NOW.. Jbc.wto.highlights.reut/index.html>. The November Agreement is said
to mark the first bilateral agreement to open China's telecommunications sec-
tor, both in scope and direct investment. See Summary of US-China Bilateral
WTO Agreement, US-CmNA BusINEss CouNcm (visited Jan. 10, 2000) <httpJ/
www.uschina.org/public/991115a.html> [hereinafter The Summary].
139. See, e.g., Welcome to the Club, supra note 2; Highlights of China-US
WTO accord, supra note 138. For an excellent discussion of foreign investors
ability to invest and operate in the Chinese Internet market, see Leslie Chang
and Ian Johnson, China Internet Investors Face Web of New Rules, WALL
STREET J., Dec. 13, 1999, at A25.
140. See, e.g., Welcome to the Club, supra note 2; Highlights of China-US
WTO accord, supra note 138. For the first time in history, China will also per-
mit the right of private agriculture trade without having to use Chinese SOEs.
China also committed to eliminate SPF barriers associated with agriculture
products. See The Summary, supra note 138.
141. See, e.g., Welcome to the Club, supra note 2; Highlights of China-US
WTO accord, supra note 138.
142. See The Summary, supra note 138.
143. See Welcome to the Club, supra note 2.
144. See Highlights of China-US WTO accord, supra note 138.
145. See Welcome to the Club, supra note 2.
146. See Highlights of China-US WTO accord, supra note 138.
147. See Welcome to the Club, supra note 2. But cf. Highlights of the China-
US WTO accord, supra note 138 (providing that China "will allow 49 percent
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vii. Travel and Tourism. China has agreed to allow unfettered ac-
cess to the hotel market, with foreign businesses having the abil-
ity to establish wholly-owned operations in China three years
after accession. 148
viii. Safeguards. China has agreed that United States safeguards
shall be remain in place for 12 years after China's accession to
the WTO in order to prevent sudden (and unstoppable) surges in
imports from harming domestic producers. 149 China has also
agreed to be subject to the United States' stringent antidumping
methodology (applicable to non-market economies) for another
15 years. 150
ix. Industrial Tariff Reductions. China has agreed to reduce import
tariffs for automobiles1 51 and wood/paper, 152 and undertake a
chemical harmonization initiative which will cap tariff rates (6%
maximum rate) based on the classification of a chemical. 153
x. Securities. China will allow minority, foreign-owned enterprises
to participate in funds management on the same terms as Chi-
nese firms, and such enterprises will gain greater engagement
rights as the Chinese market expands.' 54
xi. Protocol Provisions. Upon accession, China will implement the
TRIMs Agreement; eliminate (and refuse to enforce) local con-
tent requirements and trade and foreign exchange balancing re-
quirements; and enforce laws relating to technology transfer only
if they are in accordance with WTO agreements. 15 5
xii. SOEs. China has agreed to ensure that its SOEs will purchase
and sale goods exclusively on commercial considerations, such as
quality, price and marketability. 15 6 Chinese SOEs are to be
foreign participation" in distribution joint ventures and has "also agreed to im-
port 40 foreign films after accession, rising to 50 fims in three years").
148. See Welcome to the Club, supra note 2; Highlights of the China-US
WTO accord, supra note 138.
149. See Welcome to the Club, supra note 2 (noting that import surges may
by the United States with temporary, higher tariffs during such time); High-
lights of the China-US WTO accord, supra note 138. See also Claude E. Barfield
and Mark A. Groomsbridge, Two Sides to China's WTO Membership, CENTER
FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES, Nov. 22, 1999 (visited Dec. 5, 1999) <httpi/www.
freetrade.orgpubs/articles/mg-11-22-99.html> (noting that under the Novem-
ber accord, the Chinese agreed to be subject to the present United States policy
regarding safeguards for a period of nine years in relation to textiles).
150. See Welcome to the Club, supra note 2; Highlights of the China-US
WTO accord, supra note 138 (noting that during such time, the United States
will retain its current method for evaluating whether China is dumping goods
into the United States market).
151. See Highlights of the China-US WTO accord, supra note 138 (reducing
import tariffs to 25% from the present levels - 80 to 100% import tariffs - by the
year 2006).
152. See id. (reducing import tariffs to between 5 and 7.5 percent from the
present levels - between 12 and 20 percent - upon accession to the WTO).
153. See The Summary, supra note 138.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
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subject to WTO rules rather than being subject to State influ-
ence, and the purchase of goods and/or services by SOEs will not
fall within the category of "government procurement."15 7 Fur-
thermore, the status of China's SOEs under the SCM Agreement
has apparently been resolved.
158
B. BEWARE: REMAINING ASSIMILATION PROBLEMS
Despite the accession overhaul and superficial favorable-
ness of the terms of the bilateral accord signed in November, it
is difficult to imagine that the terms of the recent trade agree-
ment cover the gambit of complex trade issues that plagued
Sino-US bilateral accession relations these past few years. A
brief examination of eight non-tariff issues will demonstrate the
breadth and complexity of the issues as viewed by the United
States government and American businesses prior to the No-
vember trade agreement. Moreover, these eight issues will al-
most certainly be revisited by Congress when debate over the
Sino-US trade accord heats up in 2000.
i. Transparency
A staple of the GATT/WTO regime, transparency goes "to
the heart of a country's legal infrastructure, and more precisely
to the nature and enforcement of its administrative law re-
gime."159 Article X of the GATT provides all trade-related
"[1]aws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rul-
ings of general application ... shall be published promptly in
such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become
acquainted with them."160 The imposition of new or more bur-
densome trade-related measures (whether in the form of re-
quirements, restrictions, prohibitions, changes in duty rates,
etc.) will not be enforced before the changes have been "officially
published." 161 Transparency thus serves an important enforce-
157. Id.
158. See id. While reporting that the status of SOEs under the SCM Agree-
ment has been resolved, the US-China Business Council fails to discuss the
extent of such clarification.
159. Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 2 (1998) (explaining the GATT/WTO concept of
transparency, which is admittedly "imprecise").
160. GATT 1994, supra note 30, at art. X(1).
161. Id. at art. X(2). The text provides that "[n]o measure of general appli-
cation taken by any contracting party effecting an advance in a rate of duty or
other charge on imports under an established and uniform practice, or imposing
a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports,
or on the transfer of payments, shall be enforced before such measure has been
officially published." Id.
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ment purpose: prompting WTO members to administer pub-
lished laws in a "uniform, impartial and reasonable manner."16 2
While moving towards a more transparent, rules-based sys-
tem, China's multi-tiered legal system continues to reveal an
overall "lack of transparency." 163 Laws and regulations pub-
lished in the MOFTEC Gazette are recurrently untimely and in-
complete;' 64 they are also replete with ambiguities and highly
generalized, affording a tremendous amount of discretion to the
bureaucrats who implement the laws and regulations.' 65 It is
also noteworthy that the Gazette neither publishes provincial
and local laws nor normative documents (i.e., informal adminis-
trative directives that carry the same weight as formal law).166
The result is the absence of any "single inquiry point" through
which the scope of Chinese law can be ascertained, 67 which is
clearly at odds with any meaningful concept of transparency
under the GATT/WTO regime.
ii. Inspection Standards, Certification, and Testing
Under Chinese law, goods that are included on a disclosed
Inspection List or otherwise subject to Chinese laws and regula-
tions must be inspected prior to importation, use or sale in
China. China enforces a 'checking scheme' predominantly in
two fashions: statutory conformity assessment procedures and
licensing requirements.' 68 Conformity assessment procedures
(i.e., statutory inspection requirements) apply to more than 750
imported goods, and a far greater number of goods require in-
spection upon export.' 69 More than 100 tariff-line items fall
subject to China's safety licensing requirements.' 70 However,
162. Id. at art. X(3)(a).
163. INVESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125.
164. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 48.
165. See INVESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125; Ostry, supra note
159, at 13 (noting that Chinese law lacks specific procedures through which
policy is developed).
166. See Ostry, supra note 159, at 13. Ostry further notes:
"Below the formal system of laws and administrative regulations is an-
other body of 'rules,' termed normative documents. These documents
are used extensively by administrative bodies, especially at the local
level. Indeed, they are a relic of the pre-reform period when legal
mechanisms were largely absent . . . and [normative documents] are
probably binding on the bureaucrats who use them."
Id.
167. See id. at 13.
168. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 49.
169. See id.
170. See id.
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China's safeguarding system, demonstrates considerable
problems, including: a lack of transparency (rendering it difficult
to determine what the appropriate standards should be or are);
the use of different standards contingent upon the import's na-
tional origin, which differs altogether from the standards ap-
plied to domestic goods; and, application of standards that
deviate from international standards for no apparent reason.17 '
Under China's Import and Export Commodity Inspection
Law, the standard of inspection of an import's country of origin
will be applied if China has yet to develop its own standards for
the particular item. 172 A widget manufactured in Australia, for
example, would be inspected under different (perhaps lower)
standards at a Chinese port of entry than a widget manufac-
tured in the United States, assuming the two nation's domestic
standards differ and China does not have its own inspection
standards for widgets. This type of "to each his own" treatment
is clearly at odds with the principle of national treatment upon
which the WTO stands, especially in the context of Article IX of
the GATT 1994.173
China also requires that all imported, manufactured goods
receive a quality license before entering Chinese borders. 174
With few exceptions, China does not honor quality certifications
of American origin with respect to manufacturing procedures or
171. See id. See also 1997 ANruAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 190 (noting
that "duplicative and discriminatory standards and or licensing requirements
[are] also common").
172. See Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Re-
public of China on Import and Export Commodity Inspection, art. 10 (visited
Feb. 17, 1999) <http'/www.chinaexpo.comlaws/law6/lawO6O2.html> (ap-
proved by the State Council on Oct. 7, 1992; and promulgated by Decree No. 5 of
the State Administration for Import and Export Commodity Inspection on Oct.
23, 1992) [hereinafter Commodity Regulations]. More specifically, Article 10(4)
provides:
"In the absence of compulsory standards or other inspection standards
which must be complied with as specified by laws or administrative
regulations, and in case inspection standards are either not agreed
upon or agreed upon unclearly in the contract, the inspection shall be
conducted according to the standards of the manufacturing country, or
relevant international standards or the standards designated by the
State Administration for Commodity Inspection."
Id.
173. See GATr 1994, supra note 30, at art. IX (providing that the con-
tracting parties "shall accord to the products of territories of other contracting
parties treatment with regard to making requirements no less favorable than
the treatment accorded to like products of any third country").
174. See Commodity Regulations, supra note 172, at arts. 13-23. See also
1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 50.
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product quality.17 5 Assuming that a quality certification is re-
quired and that China will not honor such from the United
States, American industries desiring to export to China are
forced to choose between turning to other nations for quality cer-
tifications or going a re-exporting route, alternates that are both
expensive and time-consuming. Thus, many United States ex-
porting industries consider China's inspection and licensing re-
quirements to violate the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade ("Technical Barriers Agreement"),176 which en-
courages "international standards and conformity assessment
systems" by removing standards that concoct needless barriers
to international trade.177 The Technical Barriers Agreement,
pursuant to the GATT principle of national treatment, requires
that products coming from WTO members receive the same
treatment accorded to products of a domestic origin or goods pro-
duced in non-WTO countries, which China fails to do.' 78
Moreover, though the 1992 Market Access MOU obligates
China to base its sanitary and phytosanitary measures on
"sound science," China's agriculture import quarantines are
grounded in questionable, if not unsupported, scientific method-
ologies. 179 China simply does not recognize international stan-
dards, such as those provided in the WTO Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPM
Agreement"), on a consistent basis.' 0  For instance, China
points to past Mediterranean fruit fly experiences to justify an
import ban on citrus fruits from the United States even though
Mediterranean fruit flies were never evidenced in the part of the
country from which the imports originate.' 8 ' China uses this
type of reasoning to uphold import bans on, at a minimum, cit-
175. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 50.
176. See id.
177. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Preamble,
WTO Agreement, supra note 31, at Annex 1A [hereinafter Technical Barriers
Agreement].
178. See id. at Annex 3D. See also BXA REPORT, supra note 112, at 66 (hy-
pothesizing that the certification requirements "likely contradict[] WTO
provisions").
179. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 50. See also 1997 ANNuAL
REPORT, supra note 66, at 190 (noting that "China maintains restrictions on
many agriculture imports based on questionable scientific grounds").
180. See 1997 ANwUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 190.
181. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 50. See also 1997 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 66, at 190 (reporting that China "continues to prohibit all
exports of US citrus, without regard to strict quarantine procedures or the
existence of pest-free areas").
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rus and Pacific Northwest wheat. 182 These practices violate the
SPM Agreement, which prohibits WTO members from imple-
menting "arbitrary and unjustifiable" measures, and furthers
the use of "harmonized sanitary and phytosanitary measures...
on the basis of international standards, guidelines and recom-
mendations developed by the relevant international
organizations." 183
iii. IPR Protection
The protection of IPR remains a major trade issue notwith-
standing China's efforts to provide more IPR protection since the
early 1990s. At the multilateral level, IPR protection is gov-
erned by the TRIPs Agreement.'8 4 The TRIPs Agreement re-
quires WTO members to treat foreign holders of IPR no less
favorably than domestic IPR holders. 8 5 The TRIPs Agreement
is essentially a "floor" of IPR protection, setting minimum pro-
tection standards based on substantive provisions of interna-
tionally recognized conventions applicable to the specific IPR
involved, such as trademarks, patents, copyrights, undisclosed
information, and so forth.' 8 6
Most of the United States's IPR-related accession demands
have not regarded a lack of Chinese IPR law but, rather, a lack
of enforcement of those laws. 18 7 IPR enforcement is terribly
spotty in China's provinces, complicated by the fact that a "sig-
nificant level of unauthorized use" continues in both SOEs and
the Chinese government itself.'8 8 Piracy remains rampant in
182. See 1997 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 190; 1998 NTE REPORT,
supra note 121, at 50.
183. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures, Apr. 15, 1994, Preamble, WTO Agreement, supra note 31, at Annex IA.
See also 1998 NTE REPORT, supra 121, at 50; 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
66, at 190.
184. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1999, WTO Agreement, supra note 31, at Annex 1C [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
185. See id. at art. 3.
186. See generally id. at art. 1(3), 2, Part II, and Part IV.
187. See 1997 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 190.
188. See id. See also Richard H. Holton and Xia Yuan Lin, China and the
World Trade Organization: can the assimilation problems be overcome?, 38
ASIAN SURVEY 745 (Aug. 1998) (providing that Chinese enforcement "is appar-
ently hampered in part by the fact that some of the enterprises in violation of
intellectual property laws are owned by either the government or the People's
Liberation Army"); China: Beijing's Illegal CD Market: Battle Against Piracy,
INr'L MARKET INSIGHT REP., July 17, 1998, available at 1998 WL 13711854
(noting that China's local governments often turn to piracy as-a way to raise
revenue when their budget is low).
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China, especially with respect to CDs, trademarks, and com-
puter software; 189 piracy levels have reached 100% for motion
pictures, over 95% for entertainment and business computer
software, and almost 55% for recordings and music in China.190
Pirated movies can be purchased for as little $2 per movie before
the movie is even released in China' 91 and pirated computer
software programs that otherwise cost as much as $15,000 in
the US have been sold in China for less than 1% of the original
cost.192 In fact, the International Intellectual Property Alliance
estimates that IPR piracy cost American companies some $2.8
billion in sales in 1997 alone.193
The United States also sought greater market access with
regard to certain IPR-protected products, including motion pic-
tures. China only allows about ten movies to be imported annu-
ally even though there are no formal import quotas on motion
pictures. 194 However, China maintains a de facto quota for first-
189. See, e.g., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 190; 1998 NTE RE-
PORT, supra note 121, at 53-4; Holton and Lin, supra note 188, at 748; BXA
REPORT, supra note 112, at 67-68. According to one Chinese software firm, over-
all software piracy rates reached upwards of 70% in 1997; that same year the
Software Publications Association reported that China's piracy quota was over
95%. Id. (citations omitted).
190. See Eric M. Griffin, Stop Relying on Uncle Sam! - A Proactive Approach
to Copyright Protection in the People's Republic of China, 6 TEx. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 169, 171 n.17 (1998) (citation omitted). See also Valenti Testimony, infra
note 193 (testifying that "China's domestic market continues to be plagued with
extremely high levels of piracy - 90 percent for home video entertainment in
1998").
191. See Seth Faison, China Turns Blind Eye To Pirated Disks, NY TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1998, at D2 (reporting that a video CD of the movie "Titanic" could be
purchased for a mere $2 a month before its theatrical release in the US).
192. See International Intellectual Property Alliance, 1995 Special 301 Sub-
mission 3 (1995).
193. See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CHiNA-US TRADE ISSUES, CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS 91121 (Nov. 10, 1998) (visited Feb.
16, 1999) <http://www.cnie.org/nle/econ-35.html>. Cf PRESS RELEASE OF THE
FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, Boxer Outlines Vision For "The New
Economy" in Major Policy Address (Aug. 13, 1998), available at 1998 WL
7326364 (quoting Senator Barbara Boxer as saying: "American companies are
losing $2.3 billion a year to piracy, much of it in China"). See also Hearing on
United States-China Trade Relations and the Possible Accession of China to the
World Trade Organization Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 106t" Cong. (1999) (statement of Jack Valenti, President
and CEO of the Motion Picture Association) (testifying that the United States
filmed entertainment industry lost $120 million to piracy in China in 1998)
[hereinafter Valenti Testimony].
194. See, e.g., 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 54; Valenti Testimony,
supra note 193. Cf Michael White, Chinese Film Execs Woo Hollywood, AP
ONLINE, Feb. 24, 1999, available at 1999 WL 12933177 (noting that Chinese
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run motion picture imports as only one SOE is entitled to import
foreign films for theatrical release.19 5 In addition, China's
Broadcasting and Television Administrative Regulations ("B&T
Regulations"), promulgated by the State Council on August 11,
1997, virtually cut off market access to China's media indus-
try. 196 The B&T Regulations constitute an "outright ban on for-
eign investment enterprise involvement in broadcast media" by
prohibiting the establishment of foreign investment enterprise
that would engage in television and radio broadcasting or
merely operate television and radio stations.197
Some American industries, such as the semiconductor in-
dustry, also fear that misappropriation is imminent as soon as
China develops the capability to produce advanced, technical
products. 198 This misappropriations concern may be part of the
reason why the United States is also seeking to strengthen Chi-
nese IPR laws in all intellectual property areas protected under
the TRIPs Agreement, especially with regard to the protection of
Underwriters' Laboratory safety certification marks.1 99
iv. Foreign Investment and Service Industries
China's Foreign Trade Law200 provides that national treat-
ment will be accorded on a reciprocal basis to contracting parties
governmental quotas allow "only about 20 foreign films into the country each
year").
195. See, e.g., 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121; INVESTMENT CLImATE RE-
PORT, supra note 125; Valenti Testimony, supra note 193; Report 25: New
Broadcasting Regulations, CHINA Bus. L. GuiDE (CCH) 4 (Sept. 30, 1997) (on
file with author).
196. See Report No. 25, supra note 195, at 3-4; Government controls on radio
and TV, 6 CHINA L. NEWS (CCH) 6, Dec. 1997.
197. See Report No. 25, supra note 195, at 3-4; Government controls on radio
and TV, supra note 196, at 6.
198. See China Trade Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. Telecomm.,
Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Com. (May 14, 1998),
available at 1998 WL 11518071 (statement of Michael C. Maibach, Vice Presi-
dent of Intel, on behalf of the Semiconductor Indus. Ass'n) [hereinafter Maibach
Testimony].
199. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 53 with BXA REPORT, supra
note 112, at 66-67.
200. Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 6 (adopted at
the Seventh Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's
Congress on May 12, 1994), translated version available at <httpJ/www.c-b-r.
com/English/law/foreigntrade.html> [hereinafter Foreign Trade Law]. Article 6
provides:
"The People's Republic of China shall, under international treaties or
agreements to which the People's Republic of China is a contracting
party or a participating party, grant the other contracting parties or
participating parties, or on the principles of mutual advantage and rec-
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of international treaties to which China is a party. Article 23 of
the Foreign Trade Law further provides that market access and
national treatment will be extended to services under similar
circumstances.201 As a practical matter, however, China's con-
strictive foreign investment and trade regulations stifle the
principle of national treatment in nearly all industrial and ser-
vice sectors. 20 2
China's investment guidelines (the Catalogue of Industries
Open to Foreign Investment) prohibit or restrict foreign invest-
ment in numerous market sectors, channeling foreign invest-
ment toward state-labeled "encouraged" market sectors. 20 3
Under the investment guidelines, foreign investment projects
are prohibited or restricted because their objectives do not con-
form with the State's economic development plan. China's for-
eign investment restrictions and prohibitions reflect several
common themes, including: a protection of domestic industries
that China fears may quickly succumb to foreign companies
without such restrictions; a goal of restraining consumer luxu-
ries or requiring massive imports of raw materials or compo-
nents; and an aim of avoiding excess capacity.20 4 Nor have
Chinese officials been afraid to declare their intent in limiting
certain foreign investment, noting that the guidelines "were
designed to encourage and move foreign investors away from la-
bour-intensive projects in manufacturing and real estate and to-
ward joint ventures... involving advanced technology and high
value-added goods." 20 5
Foreign investment prohibitions range from telecommuni-
cations to power and public utility industries, to trade and fi-
nance industries. 20 6  Foreign investment restrictions are
prevalent in mechanical industries (such as automotive-related
iprocity, grant the other party most-favored-nation treatment or na-
tional treatment within the field of foreign trade."
Id.
201. See id. at art. 23 (providing that China "grants the other contracting
parties and participating parties market access and national treatment").
202. See INVESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125.
203. As of February 15, 1999, a translated, updated version of China's In-
vestment Catalogue was available at the China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade's website at the following Internet address: <http:/www.
ccpit.org/engVersion/cp-jaw/cp-wsdx/cc-wsdl.html> [hereinafter Investment
Guidelines]. This website also provides translated versions of several other
Chinese laws and regulations. See also Provisional Regulations on Foreign In-
vestment Guidelines, CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 13-420 (1998).
204. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 57.
205. BXA REPORT, supra note 112, at 27 (citation omitted).
206. See Investment Guidelines, supra note 203.
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manufacturing), electronic industries (e.g., televisions, video
cameras, cellular phones), and various service industries (e.g.,
foreign trade, tourism, accounting and legal services).20 7 China
also unilaterally reserves the right to restrict or prohibit "other
industries [restricted/prohibited] by the State."208 Where for-
eign investment is allowed, it is typically subject to stringent ap-
proval procedures20 9 and administrative oversight,210 especially
in the context of corporate takeovers and acquisitions.2 1' Sim-
ply stated, China's implementation and adherence to this type of
broad- sweeping investment "Catalogue" breaches the TRIMs
Agreement, which seeks to safeguard free competition and en-
sure the avoidance of investment measures that distort and re-
strict trade.2 12
Formal permission to maintain foreign service operations in
China comes largely through tightly hoarded "experimental"
licenses. 21 3 These licenses are characterized by exacting opera-
tional requirements, limits on the form of business entity, and
issuance governed by investment quotas. 21 4 Consider, for exam-
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See Approval Procedures for Establishment of Service Trade Enter-
prises, translated by China Council for the Promotion of International Trade
(visited Feb. 18, 1999) <httpJ/www.ccpit.org/engVersioncp-jaw/cp-jaw8.html>.
Several investment projects require the approval of multiple state agencies and
administration; accordingly, this may transform restricted foreign investment
industries into prohibited industrial projects as a practical matter. See also
1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 57.
210. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 57 (noting that foreign inves-
tors are often forced into joint venture arrangements "in which they are often
required to sell down to minority positions over a specified period of time").
211. See INvESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125 (reporting that the
concept of acquisitions and takeovers, "as understood in the West, is not appli-
cable to the foreign investment climate in China").
212. Reading Art. 2(2) of the TRIMs Agreement together with the Annex
attached thereto, the TRIMs Agreement prohibits certain TRIMs that are in-
consistent with Art. XI of the GATT 1994. Article XI of the GATT provides in
part "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges
[whether direct or indirect] shall be instituted and maintained by any con-
tracting party on the importation of any product." Because China's investment
"Catalogue" effectively restricts certain imports under Art. XI of the GAIT, and
indirectly restricts imports that may be used in local Chinese operations as de-
scribed in the TRIMs Agreement Annex, the "Catalogue" effectively constitutes
an impermissible TRIMs under the TRIM Agreement. For further discussion of
the TRIMs Agreement, which makes clear why this Chinese practice violates
WTO standards, see Part IV(B), infra.
213. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 55.
214. See id. (noting that "foreign service providers are only allowed to oper-
ate under selective 'experimental' licenses with strict operational requirements,
limits on the forms of establishment for entry, and restrictions on the geo-
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ple, the insurance services market in China.215 China suppos-
edly took steps to liberalize its insurance services market with
the introduction of a new insurance law in 1993; however, while
approving more than 180 branch offices of foreign insurance
companies, only three insurers (one American) have been
granted the requisite license to operate in China.216 In addition,
no foreign insurance companies have been permitted to compete
directly against a state-run or quasi-private Chinese insurance
company. 217 Hence, these Chinese practices assuredly violate
the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS
Agreement").21 3
Under the GATS Agreement, WTO members are to accord
national treatment "immediately and unconditionally to services
and service suppliers" of other members. 21 9 Article VI of the
GATS Agreement provides that members shall apply domestic
regulations relating to services in "a reasonable, objective and
impartial manner."220 Article VI further provides that licensing
requirements, which are not unfair trade barriers per se, should
not "in themselves [constitute] a restriction on the supply of the
service." 221 Notwithstanding the GATS Agreement's exemption
graphic scope of activities"); INVESTmENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125 (ex-
plaining that foreign investment is limited by a maximum number of foreign
investors allowed and location).
215. See Official Insurance Industry Newspaper Tips Future Policy for For-
eign Companies, CHmNAONLINE, Feb. 2, 1999 (on file with author). Citing a re-
cent government publication, the article discusses ways to control foreign
participation in the Chinese market so that foreign competition will not harm
the nation's fledgling insurance industry. The article notes, for example, that
"China should set up quotas for foreign market share to protect local companies
and the market should be opened at a gradual rate." Id. The article further
notes that the State hopes that Chinese companies will form joint ventures with
foreign companies in order to effectively exchange market share for technology.
See id.
216. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 55.
217. See id.
218. General Agreement on Trade in Servives, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 31, at Annex IB [hereinafter GATS Agreement]. See also Ro-
sen, supra note 102, at 1549 (citing Import and Export Controls, China Bus. L.
Guide (CCH Int'l) 80-252, p. 82,204 (Sally A. Harpole ed., 1991)). Rosen ex-
plains that foreign service providers may only operate under tightly guarded
'experimental licenses' and are geographically restricted; the rules for such
licenses are not transparent; and that foreign service providers are not accorded
national treatment. Id. (citations omitted). As a result, Rosen concludes that
"[restrictions on foreign service providers have the effect of closing off most of
China's market to foreign competition." Id.
219. GATS Agreement, supra note 218, at art. II(1).
220. Id. at art. VI(1).
221. Id. at art. VI(4)(c). Technically speaking, art. VI(4) provides that the
WTO's Council on Trade and Services may take disciplinary action against
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for certain financial services' regulations,222 it does not appear
that China's insurance provider licensing requirements ensure
"the integrity and stability of the financial system" or comply
with the other aforementioned obligations.223 China's regula-
tory licensing scheme therefore violates the GATS Agreement.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that insurance services are but one of
many service industries quintessentially remaining closed out of
the Chinese market, with telecommunications, retailing, distri-
bution, and professional service industries similarly situated. 224
v. Local-Content Requirements
Local-content requirements, an import substitution practice
also known as domestic-content requirements, obligate foreign
investors to purchase or use domestic products in the course of
operations rather than importing those products. Local-content
requirements are used to promote decisions benefitting the host
country - that is, "local-content requirements are designed to
promote domestic production to the disadvantage of foreign pro-
ducers."225 Local-content requirements impair free trade by re-
stricting a foreign party's freedom to contract for the cheapest
goods available, in turn thwarting a foreigner enterprises's abil-
ity to independently manage and operate its invest abroad.
Local-content requirements are specifically proscribed in
the TRIMs Agreement. 226 Besides calling for greater TRIMs-re-
lated transparency, the TRIMs Agreement defines impermissi-
ble local-content requirements to include (1) requirements or
restrictions that are "mandatory or enforceable under domestic
law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which
is necessary to obtain an advantage," and (2) measures requir-
ing the purchase or use of products of a domestic source or ori-
members "to ensure that such requirements are, inter alia . . . in the case of
licensing requirements, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the ser-
vice." Id. Thus, WTO members should act upon their own initiative to ensure
that such licensing requirements are permissible rather than waiting for disci-
plinary action to be administered by the Council on Trade and Services.
222. See id. at Annex on Financial Services. Insurance and insurance-re-
lated services are classified as financial services for purposes of the Annex on
Financial Services. See id. at 5(a) (defining financial services).
223. See id. at 2(a). This conclusion is based on the number of foreign ser-
vice providers whose operations have not been permitted to operate in China, as
well as the limited number of permitted operations.
224. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 55-57.
225. Robert H. Edwards, Jr. and Simon D. Lester, Towards a More Compre-
hensive World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 169, 170 (1997).
226. See Part IV(B), infra.
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gin, or which restrict an enterprise's ability to import products
used in or related to its local production.227 Local-content re-
quirements meeting either of the foregoing standards violate the
TRIMs Agreement per se.
Although the 1992 Market Access MOU promised that all
import substitution policies have been eliminated and that prod-
ucts would not be subject to such measures in the future, local-
content requirements are all too common in China today.228 In
1994, China revealed an automotive industrial policy ("Automo-
tive Policy") that employs local-content requirements, regardless
of whether domestic products are comparable in price or quality
to imports.229 Under the Automotive Policy, foreign joint ven-
tures will not be approved unless the venture ensures a "high
percentage" of local content;230 in fact, the Automotive Policy re-
quires 40% local content at start up, 60% local content by the
second year, and 80% local content by the third year for passen-
ger vehicles, and these percentages are much higher for
trucks.231 A recently report compiled for the Commerce Depart-
ment's Bureau of Export Administration reveals that through a
combination of trade barriers, including local-content require-
ments, China has reduced auto imports from 80% in 1986 to
under 10% today, and hopes to eliminate all auto imports by the
year 2010.232
Local-content requirements are not limited to the Automo-
tive Policy. In late 1998, the Ministry of Information Industries
("MIF) issued a circular directing telecommunication enter-
prises to purchase components from domestic suppliers; about
the same time, the State announced that certain power genera-
tion facilities were prohibited from using imported equip-
ment.23 3 A representative of the United States semiconductor
industry has testified that China's sectoral industrial policies
contain local-content requirements, 234 and the US High-Tech
Industry Coalition in China has reported that foreign manufac-
227. TRIMs Agreement, supra note 29, at Annex para. 1(a) and 2(a).
228. But cf. Reginald Dale, Doing Business Abroad. The Word From China,
INT'L HERALD TRI., Jan. 22, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5109298 (arguing that
"China's notorious demands that companies meet stringent... local-content
requirements . . . are less onerous than is often thought, thanks to loopholes
and tax enforcement" according to managers of foreign companies in China).
229. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 49.
230. See INVESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125.
231. See BXA REPORT, supra note 112, at 49 (citation omitted).
232. See id. at 52.
233. See id. at 55.
234. See Maibach Testimony, supra note 198.
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turers operating below a 40% local-content level are subject to
rigorous "inspection and other requirements applicable to im-
ports, thus denying national treatment for such products."235 In
addition, there have been indications that some Chinese minis-
tries, including the MII, intend to impose additional require-
ments not expressly written into China's published law in the
future. 236 Moreover, China continues to push for further local-
content requirements, particularly in the context of domestic in-
frastructure projects.237
These localization practices undermine the TRIMs Agree-
ment for at least two reasons. First, China's local-content laws
and policies are hardly transparent. 238 Seldom do China's for-
eign investment laws and regulations textually address local-
content requirements, but those that do generally reflect re-
quirements facially violative of the TRIMs Agreement. Article 9
of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign
Joint Equity Enterprises ("Joint Equity Law") requires joint
venture enterprises to give first priority to domestic sources
when purchasing raw materials, fuels, accessories and other
235. POSITION PAPER OF THE US HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY COALITION ON CHINA
6, Nov. 17, 1998, available at WORLD TRADE ONLINE, Archives Library (visited
Mar. 2, 1999) <httpJ/www.insidetrade.com> (on file with author) [hereinafter
POSITION PAPER]. The US High-Tech Industry Coalition on China is comprised
of the American Electronics Association, Business Software Alliance, Electronic
Industries Alliance, Information Technology Industry Council, Semiconductor
Industry Association, Software Publishers Association, Telecommunications In-
dustry Association, and the US Information Technology Office. See id. at 1.
This paper was submitted to the USTR to assist in the accession negotiations,
ultimately concluding that China "should be pressed to expeditiously bring its
laws and practices impacting high technology into compliance with WTO rules."
Id. at 7 (original emphasis).
236. See id. at 1.
237. See China's Contractors Ordered to Buy Domestic Products with Eco-
nomic Stimulus Funds, CKNAONLInE, Jan. 8, 1999 (on file with author) (report-
ing that according to a recent article in the Shichang Bao (Market Daily), a
directive issued jointly by the State Economic and Trade Commission and the
State Development Planning Commission "instructs all construction companies
who receive government funds to buy domestically-produced items whenever
possible," items that will be selected from a "list of approved products and
equipment"); China's Infrastructure Projects To Use Domestic Products,
CmNAONLINE, Jan. 29, 1999 (on file with author) (noting that a recent State
circular demonstrated China's belief that "no [construction industry] company
should need to import any equipment or materials").
238. Cf POSITION PAPER, supra note 228, at 4 (noting that all of China's for-
eign investment laws "contain clauses stating that, when conditions are the
same, preference should be given to purchasing within China rather than from
overseas," citing Article 57 of the Equity Joint Venture Law Implementing Reg-
ulations as an example).
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such operating necessities. 239 Although Article 9 further pro-
vides that such purchases may be made on the international
market, the ability to invoke this provision is called into ques-
tion by foreign exchange limitations and China's history of bend-
ing over backwards to protect domestic producers. 240 Similar
such provisions are also included in China's Sole Foreign-Owned
Enterprises Law and the Sino-Foreign Co-operative Ventures
Law.241
Second, and more damaging to the WTO itself, local-content
requirements are commonly subject to negotiation.242 An Amer-
ican automobile manufacturer, for example, forms a joint ven-
ture with a Chinese company to produce luxury sedans. In order
to gain State approval under the Automotive Policy, the enter-
prise's charter provides for 60% local content over the first four
years of operation based on negotiations with the various Chi-
nese agencies. Assume that a Japanese automobile manufac-
turer takes an identical path so as to prevent the American
company from hoarding market share, but that the Japanese
manufacturer was able to negotiate for a 40% local-content level
over the next few years of operation. Not only does the approval
process (i.e., trading approval based on local-content assurances)
blatantly violate the TRIMs Agreement, but the process eviscer-
ates the GATT/WTO principle of national treatment. Under the
described approval scheme, China is unilaterally able to dis-
criminate against companies from one country over another,
which is undeniably inconsistent with the notion of competitive
trade. This problem is significant as these negotiations could ul-
timately lead to considerable reductions in taxes, import and ex-
port duties, and priority treatment for basic infrastructure
projects.243
239. CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 6-500, art. 9 (amended April 4, 1990).
Article 9 provides:
"When purchasing raw materials, fuels, accessories and other such require-
ments, a joint enterprise shall, as far as possible, give first priority to Chinese
sources, but may also use its own foreign exchange funds to purchase the di-
rectly on international markets."
Id.
240. The language of Article 9, i.e., "use its own foreign exchange funds"
limitation, is magnified in light of China's strict foreign exchange control laws,
regulations, and policies. See Part III(B)(viii), infra.
241. See Edwards and Lester, supra note 225, at 182 (citation omitted).
242. See INvEsTMENT CLimATE REPORT, supra note 125.
243. See id.
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vi. Trading Rights (i.e., Import / Export Quotas and
Licensing)
Clearly, contentious accession issues remain regarding the
complex web of non-tariff trade barriers employed by China.
One of the most consequential non-tariff barriers involve restric-
tions on trading rights. Going to the heart of market access,
trading rights deal with governmental restrictions on the types
and numbers of entities that have the legal right to engage in
international trade within a nation,244 restrictions which often
take the form of measures designed to control the right to import
and export goods and commodities. 245 Unimpeded trading
rights are ingrained in the meaning behind and text of the
GATT, a pillar of the WTO. 24 6 And if GATT principals are not
"convincing" enough, at least two framework agreements specifi-
cally safeguard trading rights: (A) the TRIMs Agreement pro-
hibits measures violative of national treatment principles or
constituting unequal import/export restrictions 247 and (B) the
WTO Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 248 explicitly
recognizes that import licensing "should not be used to restrict
trade,"249 and seeks to ensure such by requiring members to
publish sufficient notification and information to allow foreign
traders to navigate the legal grounds upon which import
licenses will be granted.250
China inhibits trading rights primarily in two manners: li-
censing requirements and quota allocations for both imports and
exports. China's continued adherence to stringent import licens-
244. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 48 (noting that, in the con-
text of trading rights and other restrictions, "China restricts the types and
numbers of entities within China which have the legal right to engage in inter-
national trade").
245. See O'Quinn, supra note 41 (noting that China "controls imports and
exports through a licensing system known as trading rights, which requires
companies to receive Beijing's approval for each of their imports or exports").
See also Maibach Testimony, supra note 198 (using "trading rights" as a gen-
eral heading to discuss "the ability to import and export from China"); US-
China Business Council, supra note 88 (using trading rights synonymously
with the right to import or export).
246. See GATT 1994, supra note 30, at arts. 1, 3, 13, 16.
247. See Part IV(B), infra.
248. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Apr. 15, 1999, WTO
Agreement, supra note 31, at Annex 1A.
249. Id. at Preamble (recognizing that, among other things, automatic li-
censing procedures "should not be used to restrict trade," and that "non-auto-
matic licensing procedures should be no more administratively burdensome
than absolutely necessary").
250. See generally id.
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ing requirements251 has prompted one United States industry
representative to interject that China "remains unique among
the major trading nations by restricting the ability of domestic
and foreign firms to import finished products, to sell directly to
the domestic market, and to distribute freely within the domes-
tic market."252 Import licenses are required for items ranging
from passenger vehicles to steel;253 China's import licensing,
specifically import permits, constitutes the "largest impediment
facing US heavy equipment sales in China."254 Not with-
standing having pledged to extend full trading rights within
three years of WTO accession, China is seeking to exempt doz-
ens of goods and commodities from this commitment, including
grains and other agriculture-related commodities, petroleum
products, wools, and certain automobiles. 2
5 5
251. See, e.g., Implementing Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade Concerning Application for Import and Export Licenses by
Foreign Investment Enterprises, CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 51- 617
(promulgated Jan. 24, 1987 by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade); Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Administrative Measures
of the People's Republic of China on Codes for Import and Export Enterprises in
Respect of Foreign Investment Enterprises, CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 50-
742 (promulgated Aug. 25, 1997 by MOFTEC); Notice of the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade and the General Administration of Customs on
Issues Involving the Empowering of Specially Commissioned Offices to Issue
Vehicle Import Licenses to Sino-foreign Joint Equity Enterprises and Sino-for-
eign Co-operative Enterprises and Customs' Supervision, Control and Clear-
ance of Vehicles Imported by Foreign Investment Enterprises, CHNA Bus. L.
GUIDE (CCH) 51-626 (issued Feb. 15, 1990 by the Ministry of Foreign Eco-
nomic Relations and Trade and the General Administration of Customs); Notice
on Applications for Import Licenses, CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 51-636
(promulgated Sept. 16, 1996 by MOFTEC). See also TRADE REGULATIONS &
STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 136; 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at
190-91; INVEsTMENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125; 1998 NTE REPORT, supra
121, at 48 (noting China's restrictions of trading rights regarding import control
policies).
252. POSITION PAPER, supra note 235, at 2.
253. See TRADE REGULATIONS & STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 136; US-
China Business Council, supra note 88 (implying that China still utilizes im-
port licensing requirements for items such as timber, wool, acrylic, natural rub-
ber, and steel). See also 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 48 (noting that
"China's traditional non- tariff barriers include import licenses, import quotas,
and other import controls," and that "far too many [non-tariff measures] still
remain in place").
254. China: Highway Construction Industry, INDUSTRY SECTOR ANALYSIS
(Mar. 1998) available at 1998 WL 11163240 [hereinafter HIGHWAY ANALYSIS]
(discussing Chinese market access barriers faced by the US highway construc-
tion industry).
255. See US-China Business Council, supra note 88; TRADE REGULATIONS &
STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 136. See also China May Restrict Soybean Im-
ports To Shore Up Domestic Production, CHINAONLINE, Feb. 4, 1999 (on file with
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Import quotas, intrinsically linked to import licensing re-
quirements, are also widespread under China's regulatory
scheme. To a much greater degree than import licensing re-
quirements, import quotas are difficult to ascertain because they
are largely non-transparent; 25 6 nevertheless, quota measures
can be observed in various provisions of China's hard-to-obtain
laws and regulations.257 For example, the Notice of the Ministry
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and the General Ad-
ministration of Customs on Issues Involving the Empowering of
Specially Commissioned Offices to Issue Vehicle Import Licenses
to Sino-foreign Joint Equity Enterprises and Sino-foreign Co-op-
erative Enterprises and Customs' Supervision, Control and
Clearance of Vehicles Imported by Foreign Investment Enter-
prises 258 provides that import licenses for vehicles will be issued
"[b]ased on the annual import quotas allocated" by the appropri-
ate State agency. 259 China's heavy reliance on import quotas is
further demonstrated by the Notice on Applications for Import
Licenses, 260 which provides that certain "import commodities
subject to quota controls" must be pre-approved for import and
requires documentation of a "General Commodities Import
Quota Certificate issued by a quota control department author-
ized by the State Planning Commission" upon application to
import. 26 1
author) (citing an article recently published in the Quihuo Ribao, or Futures
Daily). China has previously set protective prices to protect domestic wheat,
corn, and rice productions, and the proposed "[pirotective prices combined with
restricted imports would stabilize domestic production." Id.
256. Notwithstanding China's published list of which goods fall subject to
quota allocation, the author questions whether this represents the true extent
of quota allocation in China. Research for this article failed to ascertain precise
quota amounts, which is consistent with the Trade Compliance Center's state-
ment that China's "[q]uota allocation largely remains non-transparent to out-
siders." TRADE REGULATION & STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 136.
257. See, e.g., Administrative Measures of the People's Republic of China on
the Codes for Import and Export Enterprises, CHINA BUs. L. GUIDE (CCH) 50-
734 (promulgated Aug. 25, 1997 by MOFTEC); Notice on Applications for Im-
port Licenses, supra note 244; Foreign Trade Law, supra note 193. The Euro-
pean Commission has recognized that the practice of employing import
balancing requirements, of which import quotas are an integral cog, "is endemic
in China." Market Access Sectoral & Trade Barriers Database: China, Euro-
pean Comm. (1999) (visited Aug. 6, 1999) <http://www.nmkaccdb.eu.intlmtdb/
chksel.pl>.
258. CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 51-626, supra note 251.
259. Id. at art. 1(1).
260. CHINA BUS. L. GUIDE (CCH) 51-636, supra note 251.
261. Id. at art. II(1).
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Export quotas and licensing which also severely restrict
trading rights in (and to) the Chinese market appear more inter-
twined than import licensing and quotas. A prime example of
this trade-negating interconnection, which is basically an alter-
native to naked export quota regulation, are the Measures on
Invitations to Tender for Value for Export Commodity Quotas
("Measures").262 Designed to "perfect the quota allocation sys-
tem" 26 3 - oxymoronic in a WTO sense - the Measures provide
that "tendering for value for quotas ... [is] a process where an
enterprise voluntarily submits an active tender, enters into com-
petitive bidding, obtains the quota for value and then uses the
quota for which its tender was successful." 26 The Measures
govern all commodities subject to export quota control (more
than 55 commodities) 265 as determined by MOFTEC, 266 which
prescribes the tender quota amounts based on "the commodity's
export performance under the previous year's quota, interna-
tional market demand and current supply factors within
China."267
While foreign investment and import/export enterprises are
permitted to submit tender offers under the Measures, the ten-
ders may only be submitted "in relation to commodities pro-
duced by these production and foreign enterprises themselves,"
thereby negating tenders for any type of re-export commodities
262. CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 50-720 (promulgated Apr. 17, 1995 by
MOFTEC) [hereinafter Measures].
263. Id. at art. 1 (providing that these Measures "are formulated in order to
perfect the quota allocation system, to establish a mechanism to promote fair
competition, to protect the overall interests of the State and the legal rights of
and interests of foreign trade enterprises and to maintain normal order for for-
eign trade exports").
264. Id. at art. 2. For an explanation as to how this process fails to be a
truly "competitive" process in light of China's state-enterprise operations, see
generally Part IV, infra.
265. See China lifts export requirements on silk garments to the US, AGENCE
FRANCE-PREsSE, Jan. 18, 1999 available at 1999 WL 2530814 (reporting that
MOFTEC reduced the number of commodities subject to export quotas by
roughly half, "to just 58," in January 1999); China Reduces Number of Licensed
Commodity Exports, CmnAONLiNE, Feb. 2, 1999 <httpJ/www.chinaonline.com/
csubs/econ news/enb2-99020145.asp> (on fie with author) (noting that
MOFTEC "cut the number of commodity subject to export licensing by 50%,
from 115 commodities in 1998 to 58 this year").
266. See Measures, supra note 262, at arts. 4-5.
267. See id. at art. 8. See also John Kingery, et al., Future Challenges: The
Proposed Accession of China, Russia, and Others, 32 INT'L LAw. 883, 893 (1998)
(noting that "[i]mport demand in many sectors is still set by consultations be-
tween government ministries, not the marketplace," a policy that is not permit-
ted under the WTO).
[Vol. 9:369412
REVIEWING THE FACTS
or goods of other export value.268 Assuming that such enter-
prises qualify to submit tender offers, these companies must
first overcome several burdensome (and arguably discretionary)
administrative obstacles, including: obtaining MOFTEC ap-
proval prior to submitting a tender; registering with appropriate
State industry and commerce administrations; belonging to
"their relevant import-export chamber of commerce;" and dem-
onstrating "sound export performance" with respect to the com-
modity under tender.269 Once a successful tender quota is
achieved, companies must also apply for an export license.270
Moreover, if the company has the misfortunate of winning the
tender quota but is unable to assert it (i.e., cannot procure the
necessary export license), then the company must attempt to
transfer the quota, inevitably falling subject to a "quota transfer
administration fee."271
What are the results of these impediments? Under the Pro-
visional Measures on the Control of Export Commodities 272 as
amended, the central government retains unfettered discretion
in determining what goods and commodities fall subject to ex-
port quotas.273 In light of China's tightly controlled export
licenses, companies face the very real threat of expending tre-
mendous amounts of time and money only to come up short,
268. Measures, supra note 262, at art. 11 (reading Art. 11 in light of the
Foreign Trade Law makes clear that enterprises submitting tenders are also
prohibited from exporting products that are prohibited from being imported).
See also POSION PAPER, supra note 235, at 2 (noting that unless foreign firms
"engage in local manufacturing, foreign companies are required to sell through
Chinese trading agents who charge a transaction fee equal to about 1-3% of the
contract value," and that these agents generally provide "no value-added so
that their transaction fee represents an additional business tax").
269. Measures, supra note 262, at art. 11.
270. See id. at art. 19.
271. Id. at art. 20.
272. CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 50-708 (promulgated Dec. 30, 1992 by
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade).
273. See id. at I. As provided under Part I of the Provisional Measures on
the Control of Export Commodities:
"These are mainly the following export commodities: bulk exports of
resources that are of importance to the national economy and people's
livelihood, and the bulk of traditional products that account for a large
portion of China's total exports; key commodities that have a dominant
effect on the whole or specific markets of the world and goods with quo-
tas imposed by foreign countries or through China's own initiative af-
ter requests by foreign countries; commodities that are exported in
huge quantities but which easily create problems being exported; im-
portant brand name, top quality, or special local products, and those
having to meet other specific export conditions."
Id. (emphasis added).
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even having to pay a demoralizing fee; combining trading right
impediments with the previously discussed foreign investment
guidelines, import and export restrictions greatly hamper for-
eign investors. The negative effects of these anti-free trade
measures become magnified with concerns that "there is not con-
sistent treatment of export control requirements among China's
major trading partners,"274 and that some Chinese ministries
"intend to impose their own requirements" on export caps above
and beyond those written into China's published policies. 275
Moreover, China's licensing requirements hinder, if not nul-
lify, distribution efforts in China's domestic market.27 6 The re-
sult has been the development of "a large illegal 'grey' market"
for many goods and commodities, ultimately reducing the official
demand (in supply and price terms) of imports and thus, Ameri-
can industries' profit margins. 27 7 Additionally, China's quota
system as it relates to SOEs is noteworthy. While China's ex-
port quota policy professes to establish a competitive tender of-
fer system, it arguably entails the State submitting bids to itself.
In other words, because SOEs remain under State control (at
least until divesting more than 50% ownership and imposing
fewer approval requirements), the State indirectly controls ten-
ders made by SOEs. At a minimum, this reeks of impropriety;
at its worst, it undercuts the notion of competitive bidding in an
already dubious export quota system. 278 [This is but one prob-
274. Maibach Testimony, supra note 198.
275. PosrrIoN PAPER, supra note 235, at 1, 6.
276. See Maibach Testimony, supra note 198; POSITION PAPER, supra note
235, at 3 (noting that only when foreign companies are provided full "distribu-
tion rights, trading rights, and after-sales service" will the companies be able
"to conduct business completely and fully").
277. 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 48 (discussing the fact that
"China's real demand for these type of imported products greatly exceeds the
supply made available through the official system") and 59 (citing medical
equipment and low-end computers as examples, stating that the "existence of
this parallel gray market, resulting in part from controlled demand, deprives
US firms of sales that would otherwise occur on the legitimate market"). See
also 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66, at 190 (providing that "China
promulgated a series of measures which impede market access for many prod-
ucts covered by the [1992] MOU, including registration requirements, the auto
industrial policy and restrictions on medical equipment"); Dexter Roberts and
Bruce Einhorn, A Crackdown on Smugglers - And Foreign Companies, Bus.
WK., Nov. 9, 1998, at 70 (noting that foreign manufacturers in the computer
industry "have relied on gray imports").
278. See Barshefsky Testimony, supra note 90 (testifying that China's state-
owned enterprises raise serious questions regarding "conflicts of interest for
government bodies which both own and regulate enterprises").
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lem associated with determining "where the State ends, and pri-
vate enterprise begins."279]
vii. Foreign Currency Exchange Restrictions
In paradoxical fashion, China aggressively encourages for-
eign investment and trade while maintaining foreign exchange
restrictions that limit foreigners' access to China's domestic
market.280 The utilization of foreign exchange requirements, in
direct violation of the TRIMs Agreement 28 ' and several provi-
sions of the GATT 1994,282 effectively prevents foreign investors
from extracting profits from their Chinese operations in their re-
spective national currencies. 28 3 At least one commentator notes
that a "panoply of regulations restrict the ability of foreign in-
vestors in China to take profits out of the country in hard cur-
rency;"28 4 however, even this broadly accurate statement
arguably underscores the difficulty surrounding the remittance
of profits in hard, foreign currency. 285
279. Rosen, supra note 102, at 1543 (citing GOVERNMENT STRucTuREs, in
CHINA TRADE AND MARKETING MANUAL 181-82 (Donald Lewis ed., 1994)) (noting
the problems associated with planned economies as in China's hybrid socialist-
communist economy).
280. See, e.g., INVESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125; TRADE REGULA-
TIONS & STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 136; POSITION PAPER, supra note 235,
at 6; Rosen, supra note 102, at 1542-43.
281. TRIMs Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 2(1) with Annex (2)(b). See
also Rosen, supra note 102, at 1542 (citation omitted).
282. See generally GATT 1994, supra note 30, at arts. III, XI, XII, XV.
283. See Rosen, supra note 102, at 1542-43 (citing John D. Parsons, China's
Re-Accession to the GATT and the Impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement, 1
HONG KONG L. SCH. REV. 46, 51-53 (1994)).
284. Id. at 1542 n.143 (citations omitted).
285. A plethora of Chinese exchange restrictions undermine foreign enter-
prises' abilities to remit profits in their respective national currency, especially
by requiring advance permission and/or approval to do such. For various exam-
ples of Chinese law containing approval-related exchange requirements, see,
e.g., Regulations of the State Council concerning the Balance of Foreign Income
and Expenditure by Sino-Foreign Joint Equity Ventures, CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE
(CCH) 6-590 (1986); Provisional Regulations on Handling the Turnover to the
State of Foreign Exchange Quotas and the Verification and Allocation of Re-
tained Foreign Exchange Quotas, CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 8-757 (1991);
Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Exchange Banking Operations,
CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 8-687 (1993); Regulations on the Administration
of the Foreign Exchange Adjustment Market, CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 8-
764 (Feb. 6, 1994); Provisional Measures on the Administration of Foreign Ex-
change Accounts, CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 7 8-570 (1994); Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China, CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE
(CCH) 8-450 (1995); Notice on the Issue of the "Provisional Measures on the
Administration of Foreign Investment Enterprises' Foreign Exchange Accounts
in China," CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 8-796 (1996); Administrative Meas-
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The Rules of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Ex-
change Control ("Exchange Control Law")28 6 demonstrate the
restrictive nature of China's foreign exchange control. Applica-
ble to foreign exchange revenues and expenditures of foreign op-
erations in China,28 7 the Exchange Control Law prohibits "any
pricing and settlement of accounts in foreign currency," which
encompasses the settlement of bank accounts involving foreign
currency unless otherwise permitted by Chinese law.288 The Ex-
change Control Law requires the foreign exchange earnings of
domestic organizations (i.e., any enterprise operating in China,
including foreign investment enterprises) "be remitted back into
China," and that "[iut is not permitted to make unauthorized de-
posits of foreign exchange outside Chinese territory in violation
of relevant State regulations."28 9
The Exchange Control Law further provides that all
"[floreign exchange earnings derived ... from current account
items must, in accordance with the regulations of the State
Council on the administration of foreign exchange, settlements,
sales and payments, be sold to designated foreign exchange
banks or, subject to approval, deposited in foreign exchange ac-
counts" opened with certain State-approved foreign exchange
banks.290 The Exchange Control Law imposes similar such re-
quirements on foreign exchange earnings derived from capital
account items, 291 which are "those international revenue and ex-
penditure dealings which because of inflow and outflow of capi-
tal produce increases or reductions in debt and equity, including
ures on Special Turnover Funds for Foreign Exchange and Foreign Affairs,
CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 8-798 (1997).
286. CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 8-545 (promulgated Jan. 29, 1996 as Di-
rective No. 193 of the State Council of the PRC, amended Jan. 14, 1997 in ac-
cordance with State Council Decision to Revise the Rules of the People's
Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Control) [hereinafter Exchange Control
Law].
287. See id. at art. 4.
288. See id. at art. 7 (providing that "[amny pricing and settlement of ac-
counts in foreign currency is also not permitted," in addition to any general
circulation of foreign currency in China).
289. Id. at art. 9 with art. 52(1) (defining domestic organizations as any "en-
terprise, institutional unit, government organ, social organization, the armed
forces, etc., within the territory of the People's Republic of China, and includes
foreign investment enterprises").
290. Id. at art. 10 with at art. 52(6) (defining current account items as "those
international revenue and expenditure dealings which occur on a current basis,
including revenue and expenditure in trade and labour services, and unilateral
transfers, etc.").
291. See id. at Chapter III (emphasis on arts. 19, 20).
[Vol. 9:369
REVIEWING THE FACTS
direct investment, various types of loans and investment in se-
curities, etc."292
As a result, American businesses continue to be impaired by
such foreign exchange regulations. 293 According to a December
1998 survey conducted by the US-China Business Council, 80%
of the surveyed companies reported that recent Chinese meas-
ures, which were designed to crackdown on illegal foreign ex-
change smuggling, "adversely affected" their business. 294
Concerns have been expressed regarding China's new highway
law because it fails to guarantee private foreign investors that
they will be able to exchange sufficient renminbi for foreign cur-
rency to repay loans and remit dividends; 295 the US High-Tech
Industry Coalition On China notes that because foreign firms
are exposed to legal uncertainties, foreign companies are ex-
posed to potential allegations of contractual wrongdoings. 296 No
matter the use or application, eliminating foreign exchange bal-
ancing requirements and providing safeguards against China's
use of foreign exchange requirements to control market access
will be essential to China's conformance with the WTO princi-
ples and framework.
viii. Export Subsidies / Export Performance Requirements
Export subsidies and export performance requirements are
prohibited non-tariff measures under the WTO regime. More
292. Exchange Control Law, supra note 286, art. 52(7) (defining capital ac-
count items).
293. See, e.g, Maibach Testimony, supra note 198; POSITION PAPER, supra
note 235, at 6; HIGHWAY ANALYSIS, supra note 254.
294. See US-China Business Council, Impact of Recent Foreign Exchange
Circulars on US Companies (Executive Summary), Dec. 1998 (visited Mar. 30,
1998) <http://www.uschina.org/public/fxsurveyresults.html> [hereinafter
Survey].
295. See HIGHWAY ANALYSIS, supra note 254 (noting that Chinese officials
have reported that such guarantees will only be provided to foreign joint-ven-
ture partners). This report cites several remaining problems associated with
foreign exchange restrictions, including: (1) foreign-investor enterprises are
limited to one foreign exchange account; (2) capped amounts of foreign investor-
held foreign currency; (3) State-mandated annual inspections of foreign ex-
change accounts; (4) non-freely convertible capital account transactions (mean-
ing "repatriation of equity investments and repayments of loan principal still
must be approved"); and, (5) registration requirements for international bor-
rowing. See id.
296. See POSITION PAPER, supra note 235, at 6 (noting that although foreign-
investment enterprises are legally bound to balance foreign exchange, the re-
quirement "is not being enforced by the State Administration of Exchange Con-
trol . . . [which] tends to create uncertainty and exposes foreign firms to
potential allegations of violating contractual commitments").
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specifically, direct and indirect export subsidiaries are expressly
prohibited under the SCM Agreement 297 and export perform-
ance requirements are impermissible under the TRIMs Agree-
ment.298 Practically speaking, these types of trade barriers are
conceptual opposites of the principles embedded in the WTO
Agreements.
Nevertheless, export subsidies and export performance re-
quirements tarry Chinese law and regulations. 299 China pro-
vides export subsidies in a sundry of fashions: higher value-
added tax rebates 300 and other tax benefits; 30 1 export credits;30 2
industrial policies promoting domestic enterprises,30 3 including
State-mandated support from central banks;30 4 direct subsidiza-
tion;30 5 and multifarious practices involving SOEs, absorption of
debt in particular. 30 6 Naked export subsidization ranges from
direct price support of agriculture commodities (such as China's
subsidization of corn exports in 1997, which were sold between
$20 and $30 below domestic corn prices)307 to the outright provi-
sion of energy, materials and labor.30 All of these subsidization
practices thwart the WTO goal of free, competitive global trade
because they make it easier for China's domestic exporters "to
297. See generally SCM Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 3.1(a).
298. See generally TRIMs Agreement, supra note 29, at art. 2 with Annex
(1).
299. See, e.g., INVESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125; REGULATIONS &
STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 136; 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 52-
53; Greg Mastel, The WTO and Nonmarket Economies, 21 WASH. Q. 5 (Summer
1998).
300. See Foreign trade & payments: Tightening the trade regime, THE ECON-
OMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT LTD., Nov. 26, 1998, available at 1998 WL 22843508.
As of late July 1999, MOFTEC is contemplating further increases in tax re-
bates. See Report: More Tax Rebates Possible If Exports Stay Weak, INSIE
CHINA TODAY, July 22, 1999 (on file with author).
301. See POSITION PAPER, supra note 235, at 5; 1998 NTE REPORT, supra
note 121, at 52.
302. See POSITION PAPER, supra note 235, at 5; 1998 NTE REPORT, supra
note 121, at 52. See also Lingle, supra note 97.
303. See US-China Business Council, supra note 88. See also Part IV, infra.
304. See US-China Business Council, supra note 88; 1998 NTE REPORT,
supra note 121, at 52.
305. See US-China Business Council, supra note 88; 1998 NTE REPORT,
supra note 121, at 52-53.
306. See Part V, infra.
307. See 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 52.
308. See Charles E. Roh, et al., Future Challenges: The Proposed Accession
of China, Russia, and Others, 32 INT'L LAw. 883 (1998) (comments ofGreg Mas-
tel, vice president of the Economic Strategy Institute).
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export goods at a below-market price, and thus. . . underprice
goods from countries without similar subsidies."30 9
Consider just a few provisions of Chinese law and regula-
tions. The Administrative Measures of the Customs of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China Governing Import and Export
Commodities Involved in Import Processing provide that (A)
parts and materials "imported exclusively for processing prod-
ucts for exports shall be exempted by Customs from import duty
and product tax (or value-added tax), based on the actual
amounts used in the processing of exports" and (B) such finished
products "shall be exempt from export duty when exported after
processing."310 Chinese income tax law effectuates export subsi-
dization by imposing a 20% income tax against foreign competi-
tors even if the foreign enterprise "has no establishment or place
in China but derives profit" from sources inside China;311 regu-
lations involving the importation of materials and goods for cer-
tain real estate construction, which may apply to domestic
exporters, effectively constitute indirect export subsidization.312
These examples clearly demonstrate China's dedication to fos-
tering its domestic export industry at the expense of foreign
competition, which undeniably violates the basic tenets of the
WTO.
309. Rosen, supra note 102, at 1545 (explaining how China's export subsidi-
zation practices violate the GATT/WTO framework).
310. Administrative Measures of the Customs of the People's Republic of
China Governing Import and Export Commodities Involved in Import Process-
ing, art. 3, CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 50-675 (promulgated May 6, 1988 by
the General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China) (fur-
ther providing that if the exempted, imported material is not "completely con-
sumed in the process," then Chinese Customs are allowed to tax or levy a duty
against the surplus portions based on their estimated value).
311. Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises With
Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, art. 19 (visited Feb. 17, 1998)
<http'J/www.chinaexpo.com/laws/law03/law0301.html> (adopting the Fourth
Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on Apr. 9, 1991, effective as
of July 1, 1991).
312. See Notice of the State Council on Issues concerning the Levying and
Collection of Taxes on Materials and Goods Imported for Real Estate Construc-
tion, CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 50-615 (Decision No. 10 promulgated Apr.
23, 1995 by the State Council) (providing in Article 3 that "[miaterials, goods
and equipments" imported for enumerated projects or into geographic zones re-
lating to real estate construction "can enjoy preferential treatment in the way of
reduction of and exemption from import duty and import circulating taxes"). A
textual interpretation of this Notice would mean that domestic exporting enter-
prises would able to import cheap goods or materials at no cost, which is effec-
tively a subsidization of the building or construction costs and in turn,
subsidization for the market cost of the enterprise's exported product.
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China, while formally removing most such requirements
from the text of Chinese law, also continues to exact formidable
export licensing requirements.3 13 Strongly encouraged by vari-
ous State agencies such as MOFTEC, export requirements are
contractually stipulated in many Sino-foreigner enterprises
agreements. 314 Whether an enterprise is able to accomplish ex-
port performance requirements (export targets in particular),
which are normally negotiated directly between the enterprise
partners and State agencies, factors into whether the enter-
prise's annual certification is renewed, certification of which is
necessary to obtain foreign exchange under the Chinese legal
system.315
Article 3 of the Detailed Implementing Rules for the Law of
the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enter-
prises31 6 is but one example of formal Chinese law still imposing
export performance requirements. Article 3 provides that
wholly foreign-owned enterprises must either (1) transfer ad-
vance technology to the Chinese operation or (2) export "more
313. See INVESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125. See also 1998 NTE
REPORT, supra note 121, at 52 (noting that China "also generates exports by
imposing export requirements on Chinese foreign trade corporations (FTCs)
and foreign-invested enterprises"); POSITION PAPER, supra note 235, at 5; Hol-
ton and Lin, supra note 188, at 745 (noting that "[floreign investment projects
commonly have had to assure that some minimum percentage of output would
be exported").
314. See INVESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125.
315. See id. See also Laws of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, art. 13 (Apr. 1 4, 1990) as published in Baker &
McKenzie, Doing Business in China 41 (Oct. 1997) (hereinafter Baker & Mc-
Kenzie) (providing that "if one party fails to fulfill its obligations under the con-
tract... [then] the contract may be terminated"); Implementing Regulations for
the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ven-
tures, art. 102 (Dec. 21, 1987) as published in Baker & McKenzie, id. at 75-76
(clarifying that a joint venture "is to be dissolved" upon "the failure of one of the
joint venture parties to perform the obligations stipulated in the joint venture
agreement, contract or articles of association," as well as its inability "to attain
its business goals"); Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign
Cooperative Joint Ventures, art. 9 (Apr. 13, 1988) as published in Baker & Mc-
Kenzie, id. at 82 (grounds for dissolution); Detailed Implementing Rules for the
Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint
Ventures, art. 48 (Sept. 4, 1995) as published in Baker & McKenzie, id. at 107
(providing that cooperative joint ventures "shall be dissolved.., if one, several
or all of the Chinese and foreign parties fail to perform their obligations under
the contract for and articles of association of the cooperative joint venture").
316. See Detailed Implementing Rules for the Law of the People's Republic
of China on Wholly Foreign- Owned Enterprises, art. 3 (Dec. 12, 1990) as pub-
lished in Baker & McKenzie, supra note 315, at 116 (clarifying terms required
as a condition precedent to establishing a wholly foreign-owned enterprise in
China).
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than 50% of the output value of all the products produced in the
year concerned."3 17 Although this law is currently being re-
drafted (probably without a similar provision), reports indicate
that at least one State ministerial will likely continue specifying
and enforcing export requirements, even imposing 100% export
requirements on wholly-owned foreign enterprises.3 18 The com-
bination of formal law and quasi-mandatory export performance
requirements (i.e., "pressed" contractual export requirements3 19
and informal agency policies) certainly impairs foreign compa-
nies' abilities to be competitive in both the domestic and interna-
tional market.
IV. China's Subsidization of SOEs and the GATT/WTO
Framework
A central WTO accession issue for China has involved a con-
tention that China is subsidizing its SOEs in manners not al-
lowed under the GATT/WTO framework. SOEs play crucial
roles in China's socialist market planning, consistent with Com-
munist ideals of collectively owned and operated property. Sim-
ply stated, SOEs "remain the most important sector in the
Chinese economy" because of the domestic economy's great de-
317. Id. Article 3 reads:
"The establishment of wholly foreign-owned enterprises must be beneficial
to the development of China's national economy and yield notable economic
benefits. In addition, either of the following two conditions shall be met:
The enterprise will use advanced technology and equipment, develop
new products, save energy and raw materials, upgrade and replace ex-
isting products and/or produce products that can substitute imports; or
The output value of products exported each year will be more than 50
percent of the output value of all the products produced in the year
concerned, and a balance of foreign exchange revenue and expenditure
or a surplus of foreign exchange revenue can be achieved."
Id.
318. See POSITION PAPER, supra note 235, at 6 (reporting that the Ministry of
Information Industries "plans to specify a 100% export requirement for [wholly-
owned foreign enterprises], 70% for 70%-owned [foreign-invested enterprises],
etc."). See also Maibach Testimony, supra note 198 (testifying that early re-
ports of the in- progress draft law "indicated that the electronics industrial pol-
icy could proscribe foreign majority ownership of semiconductor Firms,
establish export requirements for Sino-foreign joint ventures, and provide the
basis for eventual displacement of foreign semiconductors in China by domesti-
cally-made devices").
319. See Maibach Testimony, supra note 198 (testifying that "many US com-
panies have been pressed by the Chinese approval authorities to agree to export
targets").
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pendence on SOE-manufactured goods and the prodigious per-
centage of the citizenry employed by SOEs. 320
State-owned enterprises are pervasive in all aspects of the
Chinese economy. China's industrial infra-structure relies
heavily on SOEs, especially in areas demanding substantial cap-
ital investment.321 China's banking industry is also heavily
comprised of SOEs - in fact, "the banks in China all belong to
the state."3 22 State enterprises include both large and small
scale operations; 323 SOEs provide stability in rural and urban
area, having employed 75% of the urban labor force in past
years.3 24 An estimated one to two hundred million Chinese 325
are employed by the 300,000 plus state enterprises.326 State op-
erations have accounted for 70% of China's Trade Development
320. See K. Matthew Wong, Securities Regulation in China and Their Cor-
porate Finance Implications on State Enterprise Reform, 65 FORDHAM L. REv.
1221, 1226 (1996).
321. See, e.g., BACKGROUND NOTES, supra note 5 (noting that SOEs pervade,
among others, the steal, coal, iron, machine building, armaments, and light in-
dustrial products industries); EDWARD S. STEINFELD, FORGOING REFORM IN
CHINA: THE FATE OF STATE-OWNED INDUSTRY at 16 (Cambridge Univ. Press,
1998). Steinfeld writes:
"The SOE monopoly over more capital-intensive industries, however, re-
mains unchallenged. Overall, therefore, while SOEs are producing a smaller
share of China's national industrial output than in the past, that remaining
share has become even more concentrated in such core heavy industries as coal
mining, petroleum extraction, metallurgy, and machine building."
Id.
322. Why the RMB Is Not Devalued, CHINA Focus (PRINCETON CHINA INITIA-
TIvE), July 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10472477.
323. See China to Reform Small State-Owned Enterprises, ASIA PULSE, Dec.
1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 19984611 (noting that 99% of China's SOEs are
small operations, which generate "about half of all output value and pre-tax
profits and employing some 70% of workers in the state-owned sector"); Pamela
Yatsko, The Bigger, The Better: China is set on building its best state-owned
enterprises into conglomerates that can compete globally; But can it avoid the
mistakes of Korea's chaebols?, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., May 21, 1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL-FEER 6521835.
324. See Wong, supra note 320, at 1224 (noting that SOEs employed 75% of
China's urban labor force in 1993). Though this number is declining, SOEs still
employ a hearty percentage of the urban labor force. In 1995, for example,
SOEs employed almost 65% of the total urban workforce in China); See STEIN-
FELD, supra note 321 (citing China's State Statistical Bureau).
325. See Roh, supra note 308, at 893 ("SOEs employ between one and two
hundred million Chinese and appear to provide the majority of jobs in several
major Chinese cities").
326. See, e.g., Yatsko, supra note 323 (noting that China's 305,000 SOEs are
"thought to be highly leveraged"); Mariko Hayashibara, The Thorn in China's
side, AB 1998 (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http//web3.asial.com.sg/timesnet/data/
ab/docs/ab1590.html> (noting that China's 306,000 SOEs employ almost 60% of
the urban labor force and "gobble up 70% to 80% of bank credit").
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Council's $1.3 billion budget;327 China's SOEs exported more
than $63 billion and imported roughly $35 billion worth of goods
in the first eight months of 1998 alone.328 State enterprises are
also China's principal source of tax revenue. 329 The importance
of SOEs to China is immeasurable, thus helping to explain Bei-
jing's reluctance to liberalize its state enterprise system and re-
duce subsidization to SOEs immediately.
A flip of the coin, however, reveals why the United States is
claiming "foul" with respect to China's SOEs. State enterprises
get special privileges (such as exclusive access to raw materials,
technology, money, and so forth)330 from the central, provincial,
and local governments. 331 For example, more than 100 would-
be conglomerate SOEs "get priority when listing on the
stockmarket and obtaining bank loans... [can] trade overseas
without going through state trading companies . . . [receive] a
15% annual tax refund," many of which are also eligible for
"more than 20 perks, such as 100% tax refunds and the write-off
of debts amassed during state-planning days."332 China's SOEs
require heavy subsidization, subsidization that is suspected to
go far beyond WTO-proscribed limits, because SOEs are, for the
most part, incredibly inefficient and poorly run.33 3
327. See Clarence Tsui, Subsidy Should Continue, Says TDC, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 14, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3773994 (noting that the
remaining 30% would be subsidized by the State through ad valorem levies on
imports and exports).
328. See Exports of China State-Owned Enterprises Worth US$63.8 BLN,
ASIA PULSE, Oct. 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 19977188. See also Hartcher,
supra note 111, at 12 (noting that "some 7,000 State-owned firms" have special
trading rights).
329. See Jiang Hong, China: Role of State-Owned Enterprises in a Market
Economy, BEIJING REV., Oct. 28, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11665060.
330. See The 'Red Hat" Enterprises, CHINA Focus (PRINCETON CHINA INITIA-
TIVE), June 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10472451.
331. See Yatsko, supra note 323. SOEs are, however, conceptually and le-
gally distinct from other types of collective enterprises in China, such as town
enterprises, village enterprises, and private (rural) enterprises. For example,
the so-called town-village enterprises ("TVEs") are hybrid institutions - alli-
ances between TVE entrepreneurs and local government officials, or the local
government itself. For further discussion of the distinctions between and func-
tions of these types of collectively-owned enterprises, see Satya J. Gabriel, Am-
biguous Capital: The Success of China's New Capitalists in the Township and
Village Enterprises and Their Impact on the State Sector, China Essay Series
No. 13, Mar. 16, 1999 (visited Aug. 5, 1999) <http'//www.mtholyoke.edu/
courses/sgabrieLfTVE.html>; Shuhe Li, supra note 27.
332. See Yatsko, supra note 323.
333. See Roh, supra note 308, at 893 (noting that most of China's SOEs are
"poorly run and require heavy state subsidies far in excess of WTO prescribed
limits to survive"); STEINFELD, supra note 321, at 2 (noting that SOEs "still suf-
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As noted by a 1999 report prepared by the USTR, SOEs con-
tinue to enjoy "certain advantages because they are fully inte-
grated into the national economic system;" unlike most
American businesses in China, SOEs have free and direct access
to China's domestic market.334 The central government, for ex-
ample, is providing more than $60 billion through the year 2000
to promote domestic capabilities in SOEs in the so-called "pillar
industries" (e.g., automotive, electronics, petrochemical, machin-
ery and construction industries),335 industries which also gener-
ally receive "preferential treatment in terms of government
resources and funding for new or existing facilities."336 Addi-
tionally, State-run stock markets have been a primary funding
mechanism for China's SOEs. 337
China obviously believes, and has maintained, that much of
the foregoing funding does not constitute impermissible subsidi-
zation. 338 To analyze whether China's plea of "subsidization in-
nocence" is warranted, an examination of the WTO's SCM
Agreement, TRIMs Agreement, and the Article XVII Under-
standing is warranted (collectively, the "Relevant WTO
Instruments").
A. THE SCM AGREEMENT
Recognizing that subsidization has protective, anti-competi-
tive trade effects, the SCM Agreement obligates WTO govern-
ments to eliminate the bulk of industrial subsidies.339
According to the United States International Trade Administra-
tion, a subsidy "distorts or subverts the market process and re-
sults in a misallocation of resources, encouraging inefficient
production, and lessoning world wealth."340 The SCM Agree-
fer from habitual overstaffing, notoriously low productivity, and ever-declining
profit performance - all the traditional ills of socialist production").
334. See 1999 NATIONAL TRADE EsTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN BARRIERS 64,
OFFICE OF THE USTR (Apr. 1999). As previously noted, it is estimated that
some 7,000 SOEs hold special importing and exporting rights. See Hartcher,
supra note 111, at 12.
335. See BXA Report, supra note 112, at Executive Summary (iii).
336. See id. at 34.
337. See Wong, supra note 320, at 1229; Francesco Lao Xi Sisci, China List-
ing for Private Firms, ASIA TmEs, June 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL
10405442.
338. See China Insists Export Tax Rebates Not Subsidy, REUTERS, Jan. 26,
1999 (on file with author).
339. See SCM Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 3. See also GATT 1994,
supra note 30, at art. XVI(B)(2).
340. ITA, Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland: Final Negative Determina-
tion, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374, 19,375 (1984).
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ment, however, does not require members to purge all subsidiza-
tion; subsidies to certain research, regional development, and
environmental-related projects are perfectly acceptable assum-
ing specific conditions are met.341 As a result, the SCM Agree-
ment is commonly discussed in terms of "green-light" subsidies
(non-actionable), "yellow-light" subsidies (permissible but ac-
tionable) and "red-light" subsidies (impermissible).342
A subsidy is deemed to exist per se under the SCM Agree-
ment if "there is a financial contribution by a government or any
public body within the territory" that results in a benefit being
conferred. 343 Financial contributions are conferred when (i) gov-
ernmental practices directly transfer funds or potentially trans-
fer funds or liabilities;344 (ii) governmental revenue otherwise
due is either foregone or simply not collected;345 (iii) governmen-
tal practices provide services or goods (excluding basic infra-
structure) or purchases goods;346 or (iv) governmental practices
transfer payments to external funding mechanisms for the pur-
pose of carrying out any of the three preceding practices, "which
would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in
no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by gov-
ernments."3 47 Alternatively, the SCM Agreement provides that
"any form of income or price support" is the functional
equivalent of a financial contribution.348
341. See generally SCM Agreement, supra note 28, at Part IV (setting forth
the conditions associated with non-actionable subsidies).
342. See Jianming Shen, A critical analysis of China's first regulation on for-
eign dumping and subsidies and its consistency with WTO agreements, 15
BERKELEY J. INT'L LAw 295 (1997) (on file with author) (citing R.H. FOLSOM ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL BusuNss TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED COUR-
SEBOOK 507-11 (3rd ed., West Publishing Co. 1995)).
343. SCM Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 1.1(a)(1).
344. See id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(i) (providing that "a government practice in-
volves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), poten-
tial direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees)").
345. See id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii) (providing that "government revenue that is
otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax
credits)").
346. See id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii) (providing that "a government provides
goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods").
347. Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv) ("a government makes payments to a funding
mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the
type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested
in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices nor-
mally followed by governments").
348. Id. at art. 1.1(a)(2).
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The SCM Agreement is only concerned about "specific" sub-
sidies.349 The determination of specificity is guided primarily by
three principles. First, subsidies are specific if the granting au-
thority, or legislation pursuant to such authority (cumulatively,
the "Authority"), explicitly limits subsidization access to certain
enterprises.350 Second, subsidies are not specific if the Author-
ity institutes objective conditions or criteria governing the eligi-
bility and amount of a subsidy, assuming automatic eligibility
and strict adherence to such guidelines. 351 Third, despite the
otherwise non-specific appearance of a subsidy under the afore-
mentioned principles, other factors may be considered if "there
are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be spe-
cific." 352 The 'other factors' comprise such things as usage of a
subsidization program by a limited number of certain enter-
prises, subsidy use predominance by certain enterprises, and
grants of disproportionately large amounts of subsidization to
certain enterprises. 353
As previously noted, only certain kinds of specific subsidies
are impermissible per se under Part II of the SCM Agreement.
For example, export performance subsidies, whether contingent
in law or fact, are prohibited,354 as are subsidies contingent on
local content requirements - i.e., "the use of domestic over im-
ported goods."35 5 These are examples of red-light subsidies. 356
If, however, the specific subsidy is not explicitly impermissi-
ble, it may still be subject to countervailing duties by another
WTO member under Part III of the SCM Agreement if the sub-
sidy causes "adverse effects to [that member's] interests."357 Ad-
349. SCM Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 1.2 ("A subsidy as defined in
paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II or shall be subject to the
provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is specific in accordance with
the provisions of Article 2.") (emphasis added).
350. See id. at art. 2.1(a).
351. See id. at art. 2.1(b) (also noting that the conditions and criteria "must
be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be
capable of verification").
352. Id. at art. 2.1(c).
353. See id. at art. 2.1(c).
354. See id. at art. 3.1(a) ("subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether
solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance" are pro-
hibited). Exports are contingent in fact "when the facts demonstrate that the
granting of a subsidy, without having been made legally contingent upon export
performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earn-
ings." Id. at fn. to Art. 3.1(a).
355. SCM Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 3.1(b).
356. Id. at art. 3.1(a).
357. Id. at art. 5.
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verse effects include injuring a member's domestic industry,
impairing or nullifying other directly or indirectly accrued bene-
fits under the GATT 1994, or causing "serious prejudice to the
interests of another Member."358 Serious prejudice encom-
passes subsidization of an industry's operating losses,359 debt
forgiveness (i.e., clemency toward government-held debt or pro-
viding grants to cover debt repayment),360 subsidization effectu-
ating an increased world market share of the product or
commodity being subsidized,361 and other harmful subsidization
effects. 362 These types of permissible yet actionable subsidies
constitute yellow-light subsidies.
Finally, Part IV of the SCM Agreement addresses green-
light subsidies, i.e., those that are both permissible and non-ac-
tionable. Green-light subsidies include subsidies that do not
meet the specificity requirements contained in Article 2,363 and
subsidies that "which are specific within the meaning of Article
2 but"364 constitute various research and development-oriented
subsidies; grants to geographically disadvantaged areas of the
member country; or environmental advancement subsidies.365
The SCM Agreement further establishes stringent criteria and
requirements for these type of subsidies to ensure that these
they are truly "non-actionable" nature and not merely a pretext
for impermissible subsidies.
B. THE TRIMs AGREEMENT
Designed to protect domestic industries, non-tariff barriers
often take the form of government limitations on an enterprise's
ability to negotiate with foreign parties willing to enter the Chi-
nese market (i.e., restrictions on trading rights).366 The Pream-
ble of the TRIMs Agreement explains that the WTO is striving
to protect free competition and ensure the avoidance investment
measures that distort and restrict trade, or non-tariff barri-
358. Id.
359. See id. at art. 6.1(b).
360. See SCM Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 6.1(d).
361. See id. at art. 6.2(d).
362. See generally id. at art. 6.
363. See id. at art. 8.1(a).
364. Id. at art. 8.1(b).
365. See generally id. at art. 8.2.
366. See A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, WTO (visited
Apr. 14, 1999) <http'//www.wto.org/wto/legal/ursum-wp.htm> (on file with
author).
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ers.367 The TRIMs Agreement theoretically assures foreign in-
vestors that they can buy and sell, even for import or export
purposes, goods produced from beyond the borders in which
their investment is located. The TRIMs Agreement illustrates,
for example, that local-content requirements comprise imper-
missible TRIMs even if in the form of trade inducements rather
than facial mandates.368
The heart of the TRIMs Agreement lies within Article II,
which proscribes any TRIM inconsistent with Articles III and XI
of the GATT 1994.369 Article III of the GATT 1994 broadly
guards the principle of national treatment by prohibiting local-
content requirements, trade-balancing requirements (i.e., limits
on purchases or usage of imported items based on the value or
volume of local exports), and foreign exchange balancing re-
quirements (i.e., where foreign exchange access is tied to an in-
vestor's foreign exchange earnings).370 Article XI of the GATT
1994 bans any TRIM inconsistent with the elimination of quan-
titative restrictions, such as domestic sales or foreign exchange
requirements. 371 Cumulatively, Articles III and XI greatly
strengthen the notion of non-discrimination in international
trade.
C. THE ARTICLE XVII UNDERSTANDING
The purpose of the Article XVII Understanding, which is of-
ficially a part of the GATT 1994,372 is to "ensure the trans-
parency of the activities of state trading enterprises."3 73 The
Article XVII Understanding requires all members to notify the
Council for Trade in Goods ("Council") of their respective SOEs;
the submitted information is then subject to a SOE review
mechanism consisting of a working party established on the
Council's behalf.37 4 State trading enterprises, as defined by the
Article XVII Understanding, are "[g]overnmental and non-gov-
ernmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which have
been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including
367. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 29, at Preamble. See also A Sum-
mary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, supra note 359 (noting that the
TRIMs Agreement was designed to eradicate non-tariff barriers).
368. See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 29, at Annex.
369. See id. at art. 2 with GATT 1994, supra note 30, at arts. III, XI.
370. See GATT 1994, supra note 30, at art. III.
371. See id. at art. XI.
372. See note 30, supra.
373. Article XVII Understanding, supra note 30, at para. 1.
374. See id.
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statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they
influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction
of imports or exports."375 In addition, the Article XVII Under-
standing requires such notification regardless of whether ex-
ports or imports have in fact taken place.37 6
Article XVII of the GATT 1994 sheds further light on the
Article XVII Understanding. Construing Article XVII together
with the Article XVII Understanding, WTO members are re-
quired to give notice to the Council concerning SOEs even if a
member's SOEs are located outside of its national borders.377
Article XVII also clarifies, pursuant to the Article XVII Under-
standing, that the notification requirements are triggered by
both formal and informal grants of special rights or privi-
leges.3 7 8 Any special rights or privileges either bestowed on
SOEs through custom or simply assumed by state enterprises
are therefore required to be reported to the Council, assuming
the SOE would otherwise meet the notification requirements.
Moreover, Article XVII is important for substantive, non-no-
tification reasons. First, Article XVII provides that SOEs must
act pursuant to national treatment principles when purchasing
or selling goods involving imports or exports.3 79 In other words,
private traders are supposed to be on equal footing in these
kinds of commercial transactions, i.e., receive non-discrimina-
tory treatment. Second, and complementing the preceding
point, SOEs are required to "make such purchases or sales solely
in accordance with commercial considerations." 380 Practically
speaking, commercial considerations are those factors taken into
account in a free market transaction, ranging from price and
quality considerations to availability and marketability consid-
erations, to transportation and other relevant considerations.3 1
Finally, Article XVII provides that other members' companies
are to have an "adequate opportunity, in accordance with cus-
375. Id.
376. See id. at para. 3.
377. See generally id. with GATT 1994, supra note 30, at art. XVII(1) (read-
ing the "wherever located" language of Article XVII in conjunction with the Ar-
ticle XVII Understanding).
378. See GATT 1994, supra note 30, at art. XVII (1) ("grants to any enter-
prise, formally or in effect").
379. See id.
380. Id. at art. XVII (2).
381. See id. (noting that commercial considerations include "price, quality,
availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or
sale").
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tomary business practice, to compete for participation in such
purchases or sales."38 2
D. APPLICATION OF THE GATT/WTO PROVISIONS TO VARIOUS
CMNESE SUBSIDIZATION PRACTICES RELATING TO
STATE ENTERPRISES
While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all Chi-
nese SOE-related practices that are suspect under WTO guide-
lines and agreements, this section examines one particularly
well-documented SOE-related practice: State absorption of SOE
debt and losses. This practice will be analyzed under the Rele-
vant WTO Instruments in an effort to illustrate why Congress
would deduce that this subsidization practice violates WTO
standards. Because the United States contends that China
should join the WTO as a developed nation,38 3 it is assumed that
China cannot qualify for any exceptions available to developing
nations. Before performing such analysis, however, a few more
words on China's loss-making SOEs are necessary to fully de-
scribe the extent of SOE debt and loss absorption occurring in
China today.
According to the World Bank, more than 44% of China's
SOEs are losing money.384 Between January and November
1998, the central government paid more than US$12 billion to
loss-making SOEs;3 8 5 today, China's output-oriented SOEs face
382. Id.
383. See, e.g., Marcus Noland, US-China Economic Relations, INST. FOR
INT'L ECON. WORKING PAPER 96-6 (June 1996) (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <httpi/
207.238.152.36/CATALOG/WP/1996/96-6.htm>; Rosen, supra note 102, at 1519.
384. See Hayashibara, supra note 326 (citing World Bank estimates). But
as Edward Steinfeld points out:
"Several [SOEs] are essentially insolvent.... Ultimately, many SOEs end
up being net destroyers of assets; what they consume is of far greater value
than what they produce. However, none of this is immediately apparent from
the firms' financial records." STEINFELD, supra note 321, at 7. After discussing
the percentage of loss-making SOEs in China, Steinfeld then notes:
"Nevertheless, these figures on losses actually understate the severity of
the crisis in state industry today. Many (and arguably the vast majority) of
nominally profitable SOEs in China today teeter on the brink of insolvency. In
other words, even the approximately 50 percent of industrial SOEs that do de-
clare profits are beset by problems."
Id. at 18.
385. See China State-owned Enterprises' Losses in 1998, ASIA PULSE, Feb. 4,
1999, available in 1999 WL 5083854 [hereinafter SOEs' Losses] (noting that the
total losses sustained by China's SOEs "added up to nearly 100 billion yuan
(US$12.08 billion) by the end of November 1998").
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US$200 billion in bad debts.386 While the number of loss-mak-
ing SOEs has decreased since 1997 at a surprisingly positive
rate, the central government is still expected to convert US$ 145
million of bad SOE loans into equity via the Chinese
stockmarkets in the near future.38 7
Examine for a moment China's banking industry. The
banking industry (remembering that all Chinese banks are
SOEs) is reportedly unable "ante up" on 4.5 trillion RMB worth
of individual deposit accounts.388 In January 1999, People's
Bank of China Governor Dai announced that more than 20% of
Chinese bank loans are nonperforming.38 9 This announcement
came only six months after Beijing made public that it would
inject more than $32 billion into the banking industry to "recapi-
talize state-owned banks, which are carrying a significant
amount of non-performing loans to state-owned enterprises."390
Moreover, not only are China's commercial banks carrying a
"heavy percentage of non-performing loans" of non-banking
SOEs, but the State continually pressures the banks to accept
uneconomic policy loans."3 9 1
386. See Kit Marlow, A Week of Praise and Promises for China's SOE Re-
formers, CHINAONLNE, Aug. 6, 1999 (on file with author). Just two years ago, a
paltry (by comparison) 27.5 million renminbi worth of government subsidies
were distributed to loss-making SOES. See Shape of Things to Come: North
will Rise Again, Bus. CHINA, Jan. 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2497753.
387. See Marlow, supra note 386. According to statistics provided by
China's deputy director of the State Economy and Trade Commission, Zheng
Silin, the number of loss-making SOEs in 1997 (6,599) was decreased by almost
1,500 loss-making SOEs in 1998 (5,121). However, there is skepticism that
such figures are badly skewed by shady accounting practices and unreported
debt. See id.
388. See Why the RMB Is Not Devalued, supra note 322. See also China's
SOEs Identified As Main Hindrance to Economic Development, CmNAONHuNE,
Dec. 17, 1998 (on file with author).
389. See John G. Fernald and Oliver D. Babson, Why Has China Survived
the Asian Crisis So Well? What Risks Remain?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS. INT'L FIN. DiscUSSION PAPERS No. 633, Feb. 1999 (visited Aug. 1,
1999) <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/ifdp/1999/633/default.htm> (citations
omitted). While Governor Dai went on to state that only five to six percent of
the nonperforming loans are "unrecoverable," the authors note that most Wes-
terners estimate that the proportion of unrecoverable loans is most likely far
greater than that reported by Governor Dai. Id. at 8-9.
390. Hayashibara, supra note 326.
391. INVESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 125. See also STEINFELD,
supra note 321, at 5. Steinfeld reports that "[s~tate financial institutions in
China today provide credit at ever-expanding levels, but rarely on market
terms. Banks neither effectively select borrowers nor effectively monitor funds
once dispersed. As a result, state firms end up with capital but with precious
few incentives to direct that capital toward productive uses." Id.
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The banking sector is not the only industry requiring direct
financial support or debt alleviation. Reports indicate that
"SOEs consume 70% of China's financial resources," industries
which contribute far less than half that amount to GDP and eco-
nomic growth.392 Fujian Enterprises Ltd., an international
holding company owned by China's Fujian provincial govern-
ment, made headlines recently when it defaulted on the princi-
pal of an $80 million syndicated, foreign-credit backed loan;393 a
recent government report noted that "China's largest state com-
panies, security forces, power utilities and even insurance and
securities firms misappropriated or otherwise lost more than
$10 billion" in 1998.3 94 In addition, Chinese officials announced
in March 1999 that China closed several loss-making textile
mills and coals mines, and that numerous petroleum, pe-
trochemical and metallurgical SOEs are being restructured. 395
As noted by a leading Chinese economist, the State "in practice
has to be responsible for all the SOE's losses" because managers
of the enterprises ascribe their losses to various State
policies. 396
i. The SCM Agreement
The starting point in analyzing whether China's financial
absorption constitutes an actionable or impermissible subsidy
under the SCM Agreement is determining whether China's eco-
nomic "ingestion" satisfies the Agreement's two-prong definition
of a subsidy (i.e., whether a financial contribution by a govern-
ment or any public body results in a benefit being conferred). 397
The absorption of debt undeniably satisfies the "financial contri-
bution" aspect as a government practice involving transfers of
liabilities, 398 equity injections, 399 or forgone or uncollected reve-
392. China's SOEs Identified As Main Hindrance To Economic Development,
supra note 388 (citing an article in the China Building Materials News).
393. See Craig S. Smith and Karby Leggett, In China, Defaults Expected to
Continue, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1999, available in 1999 WL-WSJ 5438046.
394. Craig S. Smith, How China Managed to Lose $25 Billion On Its Grain
Program, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1999 at Al.
395. Erik Eckholm, Prime Minister Cautions on Social Unrest, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Mar. 18, 1999 at 15.
396. Julan Du and Yong Zhang, Unchaining China's SOEs, HARv. CImNA
REV., Summer 1998 (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http'//www.harvardchina.orgmag-
azine/article/soereforml.html> (on file with author) (quoting Justin Yifu Lin,
Director of the China Institute for Economic Research).
397. See generally SCM Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 1.
398. See id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(i).
399. See id.
[Vol. 9:369
REVIEWING THE FACTS
nue,400 if not all three. It is equally clear that a benefit has been
conferred in these situations. As such, the real question is
whether such actions are "specific" to constitute impermissible
subsidies, and whether another provision of the SCM Agreement
applies that would render the absorption of financial debt or
losses permissible.
Depending on the business operations of the SOE in ques-
tion, China's economic bailout may be specific per se under the
SCM Agreement. Under Article 3, in conjunction with Annex I,
the absorption of debt (a subsidy by definition) is deemed a spe-
cific export subsidy if the State exempts or defers certain monies
owed relating to importing,401 exporting,40 2 or taxes or social
welfare charges40 3 in the context of export operations; this also
holds true if such absorption "operates directly or indirectly to
increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any
product" into China.404 For example, if a loss-making, exporting
SOE is unable to pay its debts (such as monies owed for export-
ing charges) at year-end and the State simply writes off, defers
or directly covers that debt, then Article 3 deems that subsidy
specific per se and therefore impermissible under the SCM
Agreement.
Assuming that a financial bailout is not specific under Arti-
cle 3 as an export subsidy, Article 2's specificity guidelines must
be addressed. Article 2's first two specificity principles provide
limited guidance as few, if any, of China's laws and regulations
speak to either the State's responsibility to absorb SOEs' debts
and losses, or criteria that would enable the State to do so.40 5
China's absorption of debt or losses would, however, qualify as a
specific subsidy if China's laws or regulations "explicitly limits
access" of such subsidies to an SOE or industry composed of
SOEs,40 6 and that access was not based on "objective criteria or
400. See id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii). Based on the various laws and regulations
discussed in Part V, it is apparent that annual revenues are owed by the SOEs
to the State. As such, any non-payment would automatically constitute fore-
gone or uncollected revenue that is otherwise owed under Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement.
401. See id. at Annex 1(i).
402. See id. at Annex I (e)-(h), (j)-(k).
403. See id. at Annex I (e), (h).
404. GATT 1994, supra note 30, at art. XVI (pursuant to Annex I(1) of the
SCM Agreement).
405. For an examination of laws and regulations that might satisfy this re-
quirement, see Part V, infra.
406. SCM Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 2.1(a).
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conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, [the]
subsidy."40 7
The Article 2 guidelines also subject subsidies that other-
wise appear non-specific to further scrutiny if, based on positive
evidence,408 "there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may
in fact be specific."40 9 Such "other factors" include the "use of a
subsidy programme by a limited number of enterprises, predom-
inant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportion-
ately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the
manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting
authority in the decision to grant a subsidy."410 Under Article 2,
the following facts are thus relevant: (A) China's absorption of
SOE debt and losses is authorized with unfettered discretion
and is clearly "disproportionately large" to "certain enterprises"
(regardless of which economic sector the relevant SOEs are
in); 4 1 ' and (B) this particular subsidy program (debt relief) is
limited strictly to SOEs - that is, the alleviation of debt and
losses is unavailable to non-SOEs, such as Sino-foreign joint
ventures or wholly-owned foreign enterprises. These facts
strongly support a conclusion that China's absorption of debt
407. Id. at art. 2.1(b) (note that based on the meaning ascribed to "objective"
in fn. 2 - i.e., "criteria or conditions which are neutral, which do not favour
certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature" - it is
highly doubtful that China's coverage of SOE debts and losses exclusively par-
allel any type of objectivity).
408. See id. at art. 2.4.
409. Id. at art. 2.1(c).
410. Id. Under Art. 2, "certain enterprises" refers to "an enterprise or indus-
try or group of enterprises or industries." Id. Thus, the use of "certain enter-
prises" is somewhat of a misnomer as an otherwise impermissible subsidy to a
single enterprise can constitute a violation of the TRIMs Agreement. Moreover,
it is significant that the "disproportionately large" subsidization does not re-
quire an enterprise or group of enterprises to be in the same economic sector for
"actionable" status to be conferred; rather, a singularly "disproportionately
large" subsidy to several enterprises in different economic sectors would each
constitute violations of the TRIMs Agreement, assuming the other require-
ments for "impermissible" classification are present.
411. It is virtually impossible to determine whether a particular SOE is re-
ceiving "disproportionately large" subsidization because no such information
has been made public by the central government. It is, however, possible to
conclude that "disproportionately large" subsidization has been provided to
"certain enterprises" in the context of certain industries. The so-called "pillar
industries" provides one such example, as does the State's absorption of debt
and losses of the banking industry. These type of subsidies are not available to
all sectors of Chinese industry, and whatever minimal subsidization that does
occur pales by comparison to the large financial amounts provided to, for exam-
ple, the "pillar industries" or banking sector as previously noted in Part IV.
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and losses constitutes an specific, impermissible (or actionable)
subsidy under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.
Can China's debt absorption practices find safe harbor
under the SCM Agreement as a non-actionable subsidy? It ap-
pears doubtful. Article 5 sets forth the conditions for "actionable
subsidies," which are basically those subsidies that cause injury
to the domestic industry of another member, nullify or impair
benefits accruing to the other members, or seriously prejudice
another member's interests. 412 In defining the parameters of
"serious prejudice," the applicable portions of Article 6 provide
that serious prejudice exists when (A) subsidies "cover operating
losses sustained by an industry;"413 (B) subsidies "cover operat-
ing losses sustained by an enterprise, other than one-time meas-
ures which are non-recurrent and cannot be repeated for that
enterprise and which are given merely to provide time for the
development of long-term solutions and to avoid acute social
problems;" 414 and/or (C) "direct forgiveness of debt, i.e., forgive-
ness of government-held debt, and grants to cover debt repay-
ment."415 China's practice of absorbing SOE debts and losses
ostensibly falls within the parameters of Article 6.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 6's potential escape
route to non-actionable subsidy status,41 6 it is impractical to be-
lieve China could demonstrate that its subsidization does not
harm competition in light of the monstrous financial figures in-
volved, as well as the fact that China is "eating" such losses in
SOE reformation targeted at export expansion. Article 6 cannot
be invoked if the subsidization displaces or impedes another
country's imports or exports;41 7 significantly undercuts the price
of a like product from another country; 418 significantly sup-
presses or depresses competitors' prices, or causes lost sales;41 9
or causes an increase in world market share of the subsidized
product. 420 As such, China's practice of absorbing SOEs' debt
and losses almost assuredly constitutes an impermissible sub-
sidy under the SCM Agreement and, therefore, is impermissible
under WTO standards.
412. See SCM Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 5.
413. Id. at 6.1(b).
414. Id. at art. 6.1(c).
415. Id. at art. 6.1(d).
416. See id. at art. 6.2.
417. See id. at art. 6.3(a)-(b).
418. See SCM Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 6.3(c).
419. See id.
420. See id. at art. 6.3(d).
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ii. The TRIMs Agreement
A report authored by the USTR provides that various goods
and commodities of "great commercial value to both China and
its trading partners, such as grains, cotton, vegetable oils, petro-
leum, and certain related-products are imported principally
through state trading enterprises,"421 most likely the result of
China's ominous import quota measures, trading restrictions,
and a host of other impermissible non-tariff measures falling
within the scope of the TRIMs Agreement. This importation re-
ality may also result from China's absorption of SOE debt and
losses, which enables SOEs to lower their internal costs and, in
turn, out-compete other domestic importers, be they Chinese na-
tional trading companies or foreign-investment entities. As
such, it would seem logical that these monopolistic advantages
constitute impermissible non-tariff barriers prohibited by the
TRIMs Agreement. Arguably, a broad, strictly textual interpre-
tation of the TRIMs Agreement suggests that the framework
agreement does in fact prohibit China's monopolist subsidiza-
tion practices. Nevertheless, this is not the case.
Incorporated through Article II of the TRIMs Agreement,
Article III of the GATT safeguards the principle of national
treatment.422 The language of Article 111423 facially encom-
passes those laws and regulations related to taxes and other
monies owed, including SOEs. In other words, Article III
neither expressly nor implicitly carves out an exception that al-
lows a member's SOE to comply with national treatment princi-
ples while at the same time avoid paying charges, taxes and so
forth that foreign investors and traders are otherwise obligated
to pay. This textual approach is further strengthened by the "to
avoid [ I adverse effects on trade" language contained in the Pre-
amble of the TRIMs Agreement. 424
Despite the breadth of TRIMs-restrictive language in both
the GATT and the TRIMs Agreement itself, the scope of the
TRIMs Agreement is very narrow as it relates to SOEs. Accord-
ing to the US International Trade Commission, the WTO negoti-
421. 1998 NTE REPORT, supra note 121, at 48.
422. See GATT 1994, supra note 30, at art. III.
423. Id. at art. 3(4). The language referred to follows: "The products of any
contracting party imported into [another] contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin
in respect to all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use." Id. (em-
phasis added).
424. TRIMs Agreement, supra note 29, at Preamble.
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ators "in fact concluded a very narrow TRIMs Agreement early
in the Uruguay Round that applies to some specific instances in
China but applies less to the rather overarching 'statist trade
policy' that China fashioned as both a centrally planned econ-
omy after World War II, as well as a millennial 'Confucian' econ-
omy."425 The practical result is that the TRIMs Agreement is
thus ineffective in chastising China for its subsidization of
money-losing SOEs through the absorption of debt and losses.
iii. The Article XVII Understanding
Beginning with the proposition that the Article XVII Under-
standing's notification requirements are not yet applicable to
China's precarious SOE situation (because such notification is
premature at this point in the accession process), the most felici-
tous provision of the Understanding becomes Article XVII of the
GATT. Article XVII protects foreign traders by requiring WTO
members to act in a non-discriminatory manner when purchas-
ing or selling imports and exports through state enterprises.426
Article XVII also obligates SOEs to make such purchases or
sales exclusively "in accordance with commercial
considerations. 427
It is unclear whether China's subsidization of SOEs facially
violates the Article XVII provisions and thus, the Article XVII
Understanding. This uncertainty hinges largely on the type of
operations performed by SOE in question, what the absorbed
debts were originally owed for, and several other fact-specific
matters. However, one can easily envision situations in which
China's absorption of loss-making SOEs' debt violates these
provisions.
For example, assume that China's SOE in the shipping in-
dustry, China Ocean Shipping Co. ("Cosco"), is a loss-generating
SOE. Also assume that Cosco has borrowed more than 200 mil-
lion renminbi from the People's Bank of China over the last few
years to pay various export-related charges and other expenses,
loans that Cosco is now unable to pay back. In its present efforts
to reform SOEs, China's central government or some other arm
of the State decides to act (per the newly developing tradition)
on one of four options: (A) absorb any Cosco losses and debt
owed for duties, taxes and etc.; (B) "cover" (through money
425. This statement is based on the author's various conversations with
staff members of the United States International Trade Commission.
426. See GATT 1994, supra note 30, at art. XVII with art. III.
427. Id. at art. 3 (1)(b).
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transfers or absorption) the monies owed to the People's Bank
that Cosco would otherwise forfeit; (C) pay Cosco's debts, loans,
or so forth directly; or (D) absorb both the losses specifically gen-
erated by Cosco and the bank's losses caused by Cosco's loan for-
feiture. Regardless of which path is selected, none of these
options are available to non-SOEs on the brink of bankruptcy
that owe money to the State, whether the debt is owed directly
to the central government or one of its branches (arguably in-
cluding such entities as China's banking SOEs). This scenario
does not provide non-discriminatory treatment to foreign im-
porters/exporters similarly situated as required by the Article
XVII Understanding.
Alternatively, suppose that China Steel, China's monopolis-
tic SOE in the steel industry, is required to export X amount of
steel or import Y amount of raw materials each year (the specific
amounts and units are irrelevant), and that China's other SOEs
are pressured through informal directive to buy China Steel
products. Further assume that by carrying out this directive,
both China Steel and the affected SOEs are potentially subject-
ing themselves to financial debt or losses (e.g., overproducing in-
consistent compared with input costs, other inefficiency of
scales, producing itself into bankruptcy, etc.). 428 In this situa-
tion, China Steel is not importing or exporting based on "com-
mercial considerations" as required by Article XVII, nor are
"commercial considerations" being heeded if forcing China's
other SOEs to buy China Steel products runs counter to their
normal purchasing operations (perhaps the forced products are
entirely unnecessary). Article XVII explicitly provides that
SOEs "shall ... make such purchases or sales solely in accord-
ance with commercial considerations, including price, quality,
availability, marketability.., and other conditions or purchase
or sale."429 Chinese mandates, in this scenario, clearly run
counter to the language of and principles behind Article XVII.
Therefore, any subsidization that ultimately results (i.e., State
absorption of the SOEs' losses or debt) may indirectly violate Ar-
ticle XVII Understanding.
428. Assuming for the moment that we are, in fact, dealing with a Chinese
bank (i.e., SOE), there may be other reasons besides the government directive
that would prompt the bank-SOE to take this course of action. For example,
the bank could be receiving pressure from the local government to extend pref-
erential treatment (e.g., loans at below-market rates) to favored firms. See
STEmuFELD, supra note 321, at 21.
429. GATT 1994, supra note 30, at art. 17(1)(b).
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Finally, assume that the appropriate State ministry directs
the People's Bank of China to lend (even on competitive terms)
to China Steel, loans based solely on policy directives that would
not otherwise be made by the bank. China Steel would not be
operating on "commercial considerations," and the State's poten-
tial expunging of the People's Bank's debt or losses that results
from such lending arguably constitutes an indirect violation of
the Article XVII Understanding, too.
V. Chinese Law Governing SOEs: Passing GATT/WTO
Muster?
Few of China's transparent laws and regulations speak di-
rectly to SOEs, and those that are SOE-specific hardly address
the issue of subsidization. However, recapitulating some of the
textually problematic portions of various laws and regulations
applicable to SOEs, both directly and indirectly, may be useful
to further understand the legal basis for, and extent of, China's
SOE subsidization problems.4 30 This examination also illus-
trates what the United States Congress would see if it were to
consider the Chinese legal infrastructure in its impending de-
bate over the future of Sino-US trade relations after the Novem-
ber bilateral agreement. In other words, this section will
demonstrate that the country's laws and regulations are not
compatible with the WTO as they relate to Chinese SOEs.
A. PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS OF STATE-OWNED INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES (THE "SIIREBGUz.ATION,)
4 3 1
The SI Regulations, promulgated in 1983, are some of the
earliest crystalized Chinese regulations directly relating to the
operation of SOEs. The regulations portray China's SOEs as
"economic setups of a socialist character... [that] are basic pro-
duction and management units operating under the guidance of
State planning."4 32 Under the SI Regulations, SOEs are
charged with fulfilling State plans and accumulating "funds for
430. For purposes of this section, any reference to a SOE assumes the enter-
prise is currently participating in global trade otherwise subject to WTO
standards.
431. CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 13-500 (promulgated Apr. 1, 1983 by the
State Council).
432. Id. at art. 2 with art. 4 (providing that SOEs "are to carry out factory
director (or manager) responsibility system under the leadership of the Party
committee") and art. 7 (providing that the production and management activi-
ties of SOEs "should be conducted under the guidance of state planning while at
the same time using market-regulation as a supplement) (emphasis added).
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the State."43 3 The SI Regulations also specify that the State will
bear the burden of financial losses brought about by "mistakes"
resulting from centralized control and guidance, with Article 65
providing that the responsible departments "should shoulder
economic responsibilities ... [for] losses suffered by enterprises
due to mistakes on the part of departments in charge of enter-
prise."4 34 (This provision seems especially relevant in the wake
of China's penniless banking industry, where the State is ab-
sorbing massive financial losses). Article 65 of the SI Regula-
tions arguably, therefore, approves State-ingested monopoly
losses, which undeniably violates the previously-discussed Rele-
vant WTO Instruments.
B. LAw OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES OWNED BY THE WHOLE PEOPLE (THE
"INDUSTRL4L EvTERPRISE LA w")43 5
The fundamental purposes of the Industrial Enterprise Law
are to ensure the "stability and development" of China's indus-
trial SOEs, safeguard their legal rights and interests, and "in-
crease their vitality" while accelerating China's "socialist
modernisation."436 Under the Industrial Enterprise Law, which
is applicable to most SOEs,4 37 an industrial SOE is a "commod-
ity production or operational unit of a socialist character which
... has autonomy in management, takes full responsibility for
its profits and losses and practises independent business ac-
counting."438 Industrial SOEs operate primarily to create
wealth and increase China's savings "in accordance with State
433. Id. at art. 2.
434. Id. at art. 65.
435. CHINA Bus. L. GUIDE (CCH) 13-534 (adopted Apr. 13, 1988 at the 1st
Session of the 7th National People's Congress) [hereinafter Industrial
Enterprise Law].
436. Id. at art. 1 (providing that this law was formulated "to ensure the sta-
bility and development of economic ownership by the whole people, to clarify
the rights and liabilities of industrial enterprises owned by the whole people, to
safeguard the enterprises' legal rights and interests, to increase their vitality
and to accelerate China's socialist modernisation").
437. See id. at art. 65 (providing that this law applies to SOEs that "engage
in transport, post and telecommunications, geological prospecting, construction
and installation, commerce, foreign trade, goods and materials, agriculture, for-
estry and irrigation").
438. Id. at art. 2.
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plans and market demands,"43 9 thereby "support[ing] the social-
ism road."" °
The most problematic subsidization-related provisions of
the Industrial Enterprise Law are embedded in Chapter VI,
which defines the relationship between SOEs and the State.
The central government, for example, guarantees to provide
SOEs with access to materials and goods required for the fulfill-
ment of State plans." 1 In fact, local municipalities are obli-
gated to supply SOEs with the "required amount of goods and
materials subject to local planning or control."" 2 A broad inter-
pretation of these provisions arguably means that SOEs may re-
ceive materials and goods at discounted costs or no cost at all.
As such, the law is facially incompatible with both the principles
underlying the WTO as well as the Relevant WTO Instruments.
Despite its superficial liberalization of SOE autonomy, the
Industrial Enterprise Law might generally be considered a
rouse by realists. In trying to create legal separation from the
State, the Industrial Enterprise Law implicitly defines various
SOE "operating rights," which include, among other rights, "the
right to possess, use and legally dispose of property which the
State has authorised it to operate and manage."" 3 The prob-
lem, however, is that the exercise of such rights is subject to the
limited scope circumscribed by the State via administrative reg-
ulation."' This basically means that management of the SOEs
is still squarely controlled by countless arms of the State, includ-
ing subsidization matters regarding raw materials, intangible
benefits, and the ability - if not the requirement - to absorb
losses.
439. Id. at art. 3 (providing that industrial SOEs' primary tasks include de-
veloping commodity production, creating wealth, increasing savings, and satis-
fying "the ever-growing material and cultural needs of society").
440. Id. at art. 5.
441. See Industrial Enterprise Law, supra 435, at art. 55 (providing that
government shall "ensure that enterprises have access to goods and materials
subject to planned supply in amounts required for the fulfillment of the
mandatory plans").
442. Id. at art. 57 ("local government at the county level or above in the
locality of an enterprise shall supply the enterprise with its required amount of
goods and materials subject to local planning and control").
443. Id. at art. 2 (providing that SOEs "shall enjoy" such rights).
444. See, e.g., id. at art. 2 (providing that an SOE's property "shall belong to
the whole people and shall be operated and managed by the enterprise with the
authorisation of the State"); art. 6 (providing that an SOE "shall make effective
use of the property which the State has authorised it to operate and manage").
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C. PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS ON THE CONTRACTED
OPERATION RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM FOR INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES OWNED BY THE WHOLE PEOPLE (THE
"CORSI)REGULATVIo8')4 5
Professing to instill autonomy in SOEs by making them
"solely responsible for any profits and losses" accrued, 446 the
CORSI Regulations provide insight as to the potential extent of
which State subsidization may be legally mandated. Article 3
provides that "the contracted operation responsibility system...
shall utilize the enthusiasm of enterprise operators and produ-
cers, tap the potential of enterprises, [and] safeguard the profits
turned over to the state."4 7 Profits payments take many forms,
such as "reducing losses (or compensating) for enterprises exper-
iencing losses." 4 s
The CORSI Regulations also provide that "where the tax
paid exceeds the amount of profit turned over to the state as pre-
scribed in the contract of contracted operations, the enterprises
shall be reimbursed 80% of the extra amount each season by the
finance department... [and] [playment shall be guaranteed."449
Herein lies the heart of the problem: this type of "reimburse-
ment" is clearly impermissible under the GAIT/WTO regime.
The CORSI Regulations are not specific to developing, scientific,
or other SCM Agreement "green light" industries, but rather
"shall be referred to" by "businesses of communications, con-
struction, forestry, goods and materials, commerce or foreign
trade" - running the gambit of industrial SOEs. 450
D. REGULATION ON THE MANAGEMENT OF EQUIPMENT USED IN
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMUNICATION ENTERPRISES
OWNED BY THE WHOLE PEOPLE (THE
"AANAGEMEvT REGULA TION.?S) 45 1
The Management Regulations are not limited in scope to in-
dustrial and communication enterprises, but "shall apply in
445. Provisional Regulations on the Contracted Operation Responsibility
System for Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, 5 STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA 880227 (UEA Press Ltd.
and Institute of Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd., 1989).
446. Id. at art. 2.
447. Id. at art. 3.
448. Id. at art. 9(4).
449. Id. at art. 11 (emphasis added).
450. Id. at art. 43.
451. Regulations on the Management of Equipment Used in Industrial and
Communication Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, 3 STATUTES AND
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principle also to [SOEs] which engage in post and telecommuni-
cations, geology, engineering and construction, forestry, and irri-
gation."452 The Management Regulations set forth the duties of
the relevant State departments and agencies; among others,
these duties include the duty to "coordinate the management of
equipment in a unified way,"453 and "organize and utilize the
exchange of advanced equipment management methods."454
The regulations also establish various State-provided finan-
cial (purchasing, maintenance, and repair) and vocational activi-
ties that are called into question as impermissible subsidization.
Article 20 provides that a respective SOE "shall follow the rele-
vant regulations of the state in drawing on or using funds for an
overall repair;"455 Article 33 provides that the various State de-
partments and levels of government "shall create the conditions
for and systematically undertake the training of technical staff
in equipment management and maintenance ... [and] educate
the working management cadres."456 These type of government
sponsored activities most likely allow SOEs to avoid costs they
would otherwise have to pay, thus potentially constituting an
impermissible subsidy under the Relevant WTO Instruments.
E. VIEWS ON THE REFORM OF OLD ENTERPRISES WITH FOREIGN
INVESTMENT (THE "VEWS?) 4 5 7
Although technically neither law nor regulation, the Views
most likely carry the weight of law in China.458 The Views pro-
vided guidance during early SOE reformation efforts in the
1980s; as such, the Views may provide valuable insight as to
REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1870728 (UEA Press Ltd.
and Institute of Chinese Law (Publishers) Ltd., 1988).
452. Id. at art. 39 (supplementing the provisions of Article 2).
453. Id. at art. 9(2) (articulating the duties of the State Economic Commis-
sion) (emphasis added).
454. Id. at art. 10(4).
455. Id. at art. 20 (while noting that if the SOE "is short of the large-scale
repair funds, [it shall] relocate money from the depreciation reserves for such,"
it is implicit that the funding will come from the State should all funds be de-
plete) (emphasis added).
456. Id. at art. 33.
457. Views on the Reform of Old Enterprises with Foreign Investment,
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 431, at 880502.4 (handed down May
2, 1988) [hereinafter Views].
458. The precise legal categorization of the Views is unknown. The Views,
however, as titled, were handed down as part of China's efforts to reform "Old
Enterprises" during the late 1980s. It is not known which State authority
promulgated the Views.
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how the present-day restructuring of China's SOEs might pro-
gress over the next few months and years.
Several statements within the Views are noteworthy. First,
the Views speak to the contributions of the State to the antici-
pated "reformed" enterprise, noting that "[olid enterprises may
put up existing land, buildings, equipment, industrial produc-
tion licenses, self-own funds and funds for technology reform as
contribution [other business formations] in exchange for tech-
nology reform performed on the enterprises in question."459 Sec-
ond, and going to State absorption of losses, the Views provide
that "the funds required shall be absorbed as part of a yearly
plan, and accordingly given preferential treatment."460 Third,
the Views provide that "[a]dditional requirements of an old en-
terprise for water, electricity, energy and communication and
transport resulting from reform with the use of foreign invest-
ment shall be absorbed as part of the overall supply plan, and
accordingly given preferential treatment."461
VI. Conclusion
Until November 15, 1999, China was analogous to an eld-
erly man seeking a drivers license after having surrendered his
license decades ago in favor of a pedestrian lifestyle. The gen-
tleman's first efforts to obtain a license resulted in the driving
instructor cutting the driving test short after a few blocks. The
gentlemen's second attempt was hardly better as he still drove
deficiently. In fact, many weeks (and driving tests) passed and
elderly man's driving skills only marginally improved; needless
to say, he failed to obtain a drivers license during this time. To
his credit, however, the elderly man demonstrated enough im-
provement each time to prompt the driving instructor to offer
words of encouragement.
This stylized, oversimplified example represents China's bid
to accede to the WTO. China is the elderly gentleman and the
driving instructor is the United States, one of many instructors
provided to ensure that China is ready to drive the accession
path into the WTO. On the surface, the driver's license repre-
sents WTO membership; down deep, the license represents the
benefits of globalization. The gentleman's marginal improve-
459. Views, supra note 449, at prov. 4.
460. Id. at prov. 10 (while it is not textually addressed as to who will "ab-
sorb" the costs, a negative inference would assume that it is either the State, a
State agency or department, or a lower level of governmental entity).
461. Id. at prov. 11.
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ment represents China's slow-coming efforts to liberalize its
market and develop "commercially viable" terms of accession.
The troublesome parts of the driving test represents the GATT/
WTO principles and agreements that China has been unable to
navigate thus far, and the most problematic areas represent
China's subsidization of money-losing SOEs.462 And, of course,
each new attempt to pass the driving test represents China's
piece-meal progress and attempt to join the WTO.
Like the elderly gentleman, China is determined to get its
"driver's license," which China believes (i) demonstrates its im-
portance as an world class trading nation and (ii) proves that
China is worthy of WTO membership. Like the driving instruc-
tor, the United States suffers through the pains of China's re-
peated failures to pass the driving test while wondering whether
China can eventually overcome this preliminary obstacle and
join the WTO. To its credit, China is truly trying hard to get its
license and the Sino-US WTO agreement suggests China has al-
most cleared the hurdle.
The question is not whether China can overcome the
problems it currently faces in its WTO accession efforts but,
rather, when should China will be allowed to join the WTO?
Herein lies the problem. The simple truth is that China is a
"bad fit" with the WTO, the ultimate rules-based, market-driven
organization. China's long-standing economic polices are too
deeply ingrained in institutional principles (such as China's So-
cialist command economy) that run contrary to full trade liberal-
ization. Even assuming that China can demonstrate sufficient
market liberalization to accede to the WTO, Chinese trading pol-
icies and practices will inevitably inhibit the implementation of
the fundamental WTO principles. China has yet to demonstrate
to the United States that China can live up to any set of higher
trading expectations based China's past compliance with multi-
lateral and bilateral agreements, compliance that has produced
mixed results at best. In fact, Beijing is still trying to solidify
the support of its own citizenry, including both the masses and
Chinese officials in charge of areas critical to international
trade, people who must support China's accession efforts to
make China's inevitable tenure in the WTO a success. 463
462. As one commentator so keenly described, "[s]tate industrial restructur-
ing has become the proverbial albatross hanging around the Chinese leader-
ship's collective neck." STEmFELD, supra note 321, at 2.
463. See Mark A. Groomsbridge, Can Zhu deliver on WTO promise, J.
CoMM., Apr. 8, 1999 at 5A. Groomsbridge reports that not only is it well-known
that China's minister of post and telecommunications is against foreign partici-
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China represents a paragon of international trade uncer-
tainty to the West. On one hand, a more liberalized Chinese
market will undoubtedly provide immense economic opportuni-
ties to American businesses; on the other,, the United States
(whether the government, industries, or citizenry) must be leery
of overly opportunistic estimates of the great amounts of suc-
cessful trade that will occur with China's market liberalization.
Simply stated, there are no ways to separate trade with China
from Chinese culture and politics. The idea of "visions of sugar-
plums" appearing when contemplating the billions of dollars
worth of economic benefits that will be reaped from an open Chi-
nese market remains "despite repeated demonstrations that it is
a myth and nothing more."46 4 China's overnight entry into the
WTO does nothing to transform this myth into reality; arguably,
allowing China to join the WTO in the immediate future may do
pation in China's still-developing telecommunications market, but that a Chi-
nese dissident magazine recently quoted a senior official as saying, "Only the
trade ministry wants to join the WTO. The rest of us are against it." Id. See
also Thomas Friedman, The Globalution Game, NY TIMEs, Apr. 20, 1999 (on fie
with author). Despite arguing that China should be allowed to join the WTO
before the US misses "this opportunity," which apparently means in the imme-
diate future, Friedman recognizes the internal strive going on within the Chi-
nese government regarding whether China should join the WTO. Friedman
quotes Michael Oksenberg, a Stanford University China scholar, as saying,
"[Tihe biggest opposition in China is coming from elements in China's national
defense area who are saying to Zhu, 'You are putting us into a globalized world
and we are going to lose control.'" Id. See generally Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Beijing
rift over accession, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 26, 1999 (visited July 24,
1999) <http'J/www.chinabulletin.com/e/rift-wto.txt> (reporting that "anti-WTO
feelings climaxed at a recent meeting" between MOFTEC and State agriculture
officials, even to the point where MOFTEC officials were said to have been
"overwhelmed by the hostility of agriculture cadres, who had mobilised scores of
experts to buttress claims that the concessions were unacceptable").
464. VICTOR H. Li, LAw AND POLITCS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE 3-4 (Victor
H. Li ed., 1977). Li is referring to the misconception that there are 800 billion
Chinese citizens who are all ready to buy foreign goods, a misconception that is
based on the idea that China is a wealthy nation. Although Li made this state-
ment more than 20 years ago, it remains relevant today. An updated version of
this myth would assume that China's 1.2 billion citizens are ready to spend
billions when international trade floodgates open, which simply isn't true.
China is a still poor nation in general. Although 200 million Chinese "liv-
ing in absolute poverty have been raised above the minimum poverty line" over
the past 20 years, more than 270 million Chinese continue to live on less than
US$ 1 a day. The World Bank and China, The World Bank (1999) (visited Aug.
16, 1999) <http://worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/eap/cn2.htm>. Thus, Li's ref-
erence to "keeping our feet" on solid ground when speculating as to the actual
economic benefits received from increased trade opportunities with China rings
true today.
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more harm than good to various American interests, particu-
larly potential economic gains.
With the landmark November 15' bilateral agreement, the
Clinton administration has placed the United States Congress
in a precarious position - the proverbial rock and hard place, so
to speak. The decision whether to accord China full WTO mem-
ber treatment via permanent normal trade relations status
(having regard for China's trading history with the United
States and the GATT/WTO regime) goes to the core of the WTO
compact: extending MFN treatment to WTO members under the
GATT/WTO framework (meaning permanent normal trade rela-
tions treatment under domestic law) is the "cornerstone of the
WTO and an open global trading system."465 Unfortunately,
only time will tell whether Congress will welcome the view that
China occupies a similar position to former Soviet bloc countries
(e.g., Mongolia, Hungary, the Czech Republic) and exempt
China from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Rest assured, how-
ever, that with multiple Congressmen and Presidential candi-
dates 466 advocating against China's entry into the global trade
body, the United States Congress will scrutinize the facts associ-
ated with China's trading history, including those discussed
herein, in legislating for the good of the nation.
And so, notwithstanding the expectation that China will ac-
cede to the WTO in the near future with or without the support
of the United States Congress, this author is convinced that the
United States Congress should to demand that China pass its
driving test before helping provide the nation with a license to
drive the road leading into the WTO. At the end of a Congres-
sional day, China is far closer to being our trade enemy than our
trade friend.
465. Questions and Answers: US-China WTO Agreement, supra note 120.
466. Gary Bauer, Bill Bradley, Pat Buchanan, Steve Forbes, and Alan Keyes
are among the early Presidential candidates to speak out against China's acces-
sion to the WTO (for numerous different reasons) under the terms of the Sino-
US WTO agreement. See Trade Policy Positions, NY TIMES (ON THE WEB) (vis-
ited Jan. 15, 2000) <http'//nytimes.com/library/politics/camp/whouse/policy-
trade.html>.
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